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FINDING THE GOOD IN HOLMES’S BAD MAN 
Marco Jimenez*
 
 
This Article critically examines Oliver Wendell Holmes’s widely 
influential but controversial “bad man” theory of law from its inception 
during a speech Holmes gave for the dedication of a new hall of the Boston 
University School of Law in 1897, through its development over the next 
century, to its current influence over legal fields as diverse as contract law, 
tort law, and modern punitive damages jurisprudence.  This Article argues 
that Holmes’s theory, despite its extraordinary influence, has been widely 
misunderstood and can be more profitably understood—by both supporters 
and critics alike—not as supporting the bad man but the good, by providing 
an effective counterpart to the traditional positivist theory of law for which 
Holmes’s bad man theory has so often been associated.  Indeed, Holmes’s 
theory, which has been portrayed by some as supporting the argument for 
the strict separation of law and morality, has been attacked by its critics 
both descriptively (as providing an incomplete picture of the law) and 
normatively (as providing an immoral or, at best, amoral theory of law) 
and has been accused of artificially driving a wedge between law on the 
one hand, and justice or morality on the other.  Far from overlooking this 
relationship, however, a careful reading of Holmes suggests that he was 
himself well aware of the intimate relationship between law and morality, 
and seems to have recognized, somewhat surprisingly, that only by 
engaging in an analytical separation of these two concepts can they then be 
normatively reunited in an intellectually consistent and satisfying manner.  
In short, Holmes’s theory supports the idea that only by recognizing the 
differences between the concepts of law and justice, rather than by stressing 
their similarities, can the two be brought together and integrated into the 
social fabric upon which law must necessarily rest. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In one of the most cited1 and important2 law review articles ever 
written,3 Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated his path-breaking and widely 
influential4 theory of law,5
 
 1. See, e.g., David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer:  A Centennial Essay on 
Holmes’s The Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1548 (1997) (“Path has been 
republished and cited so many times that few of us remember that it began as a speech, 
rather than an essay on jurisprudence.”). 
 in which he sought to help lawyers, judges, and 
 2. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Strolling Down the Path of the Law (and Toward 
Critical Legal Studies?):  The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1221, 
1228 (1991) (book review) (describing The Path of the Law as “the single most important 
essay ever written by an American on the law”). 
 3. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
 4. See, e.g., PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, REASON IN THE BALANCE:  THE CASE AGAINST 
NATURALISM IN SCIENCE, LAW & EDUCATION 140 (1995) (“This lecture has been so 
influential in shaping the thinking of American lawyers that it might be described as almost 
part of the Constitution.”). 
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academicians understand the law by viewing it not from the internal 
perspective of a good man, “who finds his reasons for conduct, whether 
inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience,”6 but 
from the external perspective of the “bad man,”7 who “cares only for the 
material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict.”8  
Since its creation in 1897, Holmes’s “bad man” theory of law has been 
accused (among other things) of advocating a legal system devoid of 
morality,9 one that not only leaves the law itself impoverished,10 but 
promotes immoral behavior by encouraging the bad man (or his lawyer)11 
to choose a course of conduct not according to generally accepted standards 
of community behavior,12 but according to a cost-benefit analysis13
 
 5. Holmes once defined law as “a statement of the circumstances, in which the public 
force will be brought to bear upon men through the courts. . . . [T]he word commonly is 
confined to such prophecies or threats . . . addressed to persons living within the power of 
the courts.” Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1909) (Holmes, J.). 
 in 
 6. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459. 
 7. Although this author would have preferred to use the non-sexist terms “good person” 
and “bad person,” I have retained the terms “good man” and “bad man” in this Article 
because they are ubiquitous in Holmes’s own writings and are used by judges and scholars 
discussing Holmes’s work. 
 8. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459.  Here, Holmes acknowledges both the “internal” and 
“external” ways of viewing the law, about which I shall have a lot more to say in Part III.  
For a general statement of the internal and external points of view, see H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 89 (2d ed. 1994) (“[F]or it is possible to be concerned with the rules, either 
merely as an observer who does not himself accept them, or as a member of the group which 
accepts and uses them as guides to conduct.  We may call these respectively the ‘external’ 
and the ‘internal points of view.’”). 
 9. See Robert W. Gordon, The Path of the Lawyer, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1014 
(1997) (“Probably the most common reading of the speech is that it sets forth a purely 
positivist theory of law—a deflated, de-moralized, ‘disenchanted’ view . . . of the legal 
system.”). 
 10. See, e.g., William Twining, Other People’s Power:  The Bad Man and English 
Positivism, 1897–1997, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 189, 192 (1997) (“[The Path of the Law] is the 
classic text of legal positivism which also lives on as a sitting target for some powerful lines 
of criticism—it is at once a talisman and a target within the positivist tradition.  This is 
especially true of the ‘bad man’ as he is sometimes treated as a symbol of a radically 
impoverished view of law.”); see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 14 (1986) (calling 
“external theories,” which he associated with Holmes, “perverse,” “impoverished[,] and 
defective”). 
 11. See Nelson P. Miller, The Nobility of the American Lawyer:  The Ennobling History, 
Philosophy, and Morality of a Maligned Profession, 22 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 209, 231 
(2005) (“Justice Holmes desired most of all that lawyers disconnect themselves from 
morality—to destroy their morality and faith.”). 
 12. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1014 (“To less approving eyes, Holmes recommends 
that the lawyer regard the legal system in a wholly alienated and instrumental fashion—not 
as a set of norms established for common membership in a political community, nor an 
attempt to realize (however imperfectly) ideals of justice or social integration, but simply as 
random and arbitrary outputs of state force, which are opportunities for or obstacles to 
realizing his client’s self-interested projects.”). 
 13. This, of course, is the way that many law and economics scholars understand 
Holmes today, and their view is not without support in Holmes himself. See Holmes, supra 
note 3, at 474 (“[W]e are called on to consider and weigh the ends of legislation, the means 
of attaining them, and the cost.  We learn that for everything we have to give up something 
else, and we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the other advantage we lose, and 
to know what we are doing when we elect.”).  As I discuss in Part III, this view, while part of 
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which the bad man chooses to engage in a given activity whenever the 
benefit of doing so exceeds the activity’s legal cost.14
In this Article, I argue that this commonly accepted view of Holmes’s 
legal theory is not only wrong, but dangerous.  In short, I will show how 
scholars and judges have erected around Holmes’s mighty reputation a 
jurisprudential edifice built upon the shifting sands of misunderstanding, 
and how this misunderstanding has led some judges, including most 
recently our own Supreme Court, to base some of their most important 
decisions on a misinterpretation of Holmes. 
 
If, however, Holmes’s theory, even as misunderstood and misapplied, 
had an independent normative and descriptive force, then one could still 
defend this corrupted version of Holmes’s theory as logically coherent, and 
its influence on our law, although not in accord with Holmes’s original 
intent, could still be justified.  As I will show, however, no such 
justification is possible.  This does not mean, of course, that Holmes’s bad 
man theory of law, especially as understood by Holmes, is not valuable. 
Indeed, as this Article shows, Holmes himself had a much narrower 
understanding of the bad man’s role in jurisprudence than is commonly 
supposed.  In fact, Holmes’s bad man, when coupled with other important 
insights provided throughout Holmes’s writings, not only sows the seeds for 
the bad man’s demise (at least to the extent that the bad man theory of law 
is commonly understood today), but provides a much fuller and more 
satisfactory theory of law than has been previously acknowledged—one 
capable of speaking to us in a meaningful way today. 
This Article therefore revisits Holmes’s bad man theory of law as it was 
originally conceived.  It then shows how the bad man theory has come to be 
misunderstood and misapplied in several important areas of law, including 
contract law, tort law, and punitive damages jurisprudence.  Finally, this 
Article suggests ways in which a fuller understanding of Holmes’s theory 
can shed light on important questions of law and legal policy today. 
This Article proceeds in three principle parts.  Part I paints, in broad 
strokes, Holmes’s bad man theory of law, as it has been commonly 
understood.  Part II discusses how this misunderstood version of the theory 
has been misapplied in the areas of contract law, tort law, and, most 
recently, the law governing punitive damages.  Part II then demonstrates 
how these developments have infected our law by pitting Holmes’s 
corrupted version of the bad man against the more noble “good man” view 
of law, in which morality and ethics exist within, and alongside, the black-
letter law.  Part III revisits Holmes’s bad man theory of law in order to 
 
Holmes’s philosophy, is incomplete and only tells part of the story Holmes wished to 
convey. 
 14. Gordon, supra note 9, at 1014 (“To those who like this view, the ‘bad man’ is just 
the rational man—Homo law-and-economicus—who treats all legal rules as prices on 
conduct.”); see also Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1773 (1976) (“The certainty of individualism is perfectly embodied in 
the calculations of Holmes’ ‘bad man,’ who is concerned with law only as a means or an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of his antisocial ends.”). 
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reinterpret it in light of Aristotle, an interpretation for which there is strong 
textual support.  Part III then suggests a new way of understanding 
Holmes’s theory that is fundamentally at odds with, but more intellectually 
and morally satisfying than, most modern interpretations.  More 
specifically, Part III argues that this mixed Aristotelian/Holmesian theory 
may help provide judges, academicians, and policymakers with a useful 
tool for making and examining important decisions for the benefit of the 
good man.  Part III then briefly sketches the usefulness of such a theory in 
the areas of contract law, tort law, and punitive damages. 
It is important to note that, throughout this Article, I will not be calling 
for the bad man’s death or overthrow.  Rather, I ask, as Holmes did, that we 
endeavor to understand the bad man, learn from him what he will teach us 
and, ultimately, see the world—if only for a moment—through his eyes.  
But we must do this not to placate the bad man, but to better fashion, from 
deep within our laboratories of justice, a more suitable rival.  This rival, 
when he is ready to rule, will not displace the bad man from his throne of 
law, but will take his place alongside him, on the throne of justice. 
I.  THE BIRTH OF A THEORY:  HOLMES INTRODUCES THE BAD MAN 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad 
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such 
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his 
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer 
sanctions of conscience. 
 — Oliver Wendell Holmes15
 
 
With these immortal words, Holmes, who was perhaps the greatest jurist 
this country ever produced,16
According to the most common reading of Holmes’s theory, law should 
be approached and understood as the bad man himself would approach and 
understand it:  that is, not as an historically minded rational man concerned 
with the reasons for the existence of a particular law, nor as a morally 
driven good man “who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law 
 breathed life into what was arguably his most 
enduring contribution to jurisprudence:  the “bad man.” 
 
 15. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459. 
 16. See Benjamin N. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REV. 677, 684 (1931) 
(“He is today for all students of the law and for all students of human society the philosopher 
and the seer, the greatest of our age in the domain of jurisprudence, and one of the greatest of 
the ages.”); Felix Frankfurter, The Early Writings of O.W. Holmes, Jr., 44 HARV. L. REV. 
717, 723 (1931) (“[Holmes], above all others, has given the directions of contemporary 
jurisprudence.  He wields such a powerful influence upon today, because his deep 
knowledge of yesterday enables him to extricate the present from meaningless 
entanglements with the past and yet to see events in the perspective of history.”); Roscoe 
Pound, Judge Holmes’s Contributions to the Science of Law, 34 HARV. L. REV. 449, 449 
(1921) (“[Holmes] has done more than lead American juristic thought of the present 
generation.  Above all others he has shaped the methods and ideas that are characteristic of 
the present as distinguished from the immediate past.”). 
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or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience,”17 but rather as a 
calculating and amoral (or perhaps, immoral) bad man who, in Holmes’s 
own words, “cares only for the material consequences”18 of his actions, 
which can be thought of as the difference between the advantages to be 
gained and the penalty to be suffered by violating this or that provision of 
the law, breaching this or that contract, or committing this or that tort.19
If Holmes’s views constituted the mere ramblings of an obscure scholar 
writing more than a century ago, then all could be forgiven, as much would 
be forgotten.  But Holmes’s bad man, like Dr. Frankenstein’s own 
creation,
 
20 soon took on a life of his own, and has been terrorizing the 
Anglo-American legal landscape ever since, spreading his unsavory 
influence to fields as disparate as contract law,21 tort law,22 and the law 
governing punitive damages.23  And, more than a century after his birth, the 
bad man is alive and well today and has recently made his presence felt in 
state24 and federal25 judicial decisions, books,26 law review articles,27
 
 17. Holmes, supra note 
 and, 
3, at 459. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See, e.g., Claire Finkelstein, Hobbes and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1211, 1213 (2006) (“Law for the bad man is a yoke around his neck that restrains him 
from various liberties he might otherwise wish to enjoy.  It also constrains his ability to 
benefit himself and to further his various ends; including ends of survival and physical well-
being.  He has no sense of legal duty and would think nothing of violating the law if he could 
do so with impunity.  The only restraint on illegality is the possibility of detection, which he 
would constantly weigh against the potential for gain.”). 
 20. See MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN; OR THE MODERN 
PROMETHEUS (James Rieger ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1982) (1818). 
 21. See infra Part II.A. 
 22. See infra Part II.B. 
 23. See infra Part II.C. 
 24. See State v. Creekpaum, 732 P.2d 557, 569 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (citing 
Holmes, supra note 3, at 459) (finding that the Ex Post Facto Clause was intended to protect 
the bad man from unknown punishment), rev’d, 753 P.2d 1139 (Alaska 1988); Neufeld v. 
Balboa Ins. Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151, 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (finding the bad man 
insurance company could not act as the “bad insurer” and seek to use its own wrong, 
including the flouting of time limit disclosure regulations, as an affirmative defense in later 
litigation); Bridgeport Harbor Place I, LLC v. Ganim, No. X06CV040184523S, 2008 WL 
4926925, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2008) (quoting Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 
128 S. Ct. 2605, 2631–32 (2008)); In re W.D.P., 91 P.3d 1078, 1089–92 (Haw. 2004) 
(finding that for attorneys and future bar applicants, “bad man”-like behavior may be legal 
but may also cause failure of admission requirement of good moral character); Sorci v. Iowa 
Dist. Court for Polk Cnty., 671 N.W.2d 482, 494 (Iowa 2003) (finding the Iowa Code of 
Professional Responsibility for Lawyers is not designed for Holmes’s bad man); State v. 
Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 267–68 (Minn. 1996) (declining to rule that warrantless entry into a 
suspect’s home can only be predicated on a felony, used in the DUI context as against public 
policy to incentivize evasions from the police for minor stops); Estate of Murrell v. Quin, 
454 So. 2d 437, 440–41 (Miss. 1984) (Robertson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(citing Holmes’s bad man and the contrasting purposes of equity and contract law); Tideway 
Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454, 466 & n.4 (Miss. 1983) (finding a Mississippi 
Chancery court is allowed to grant punitive damages and that the “bad man” could foresee 
the possibility of paying such damages); Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 416 A.2d 852, 857 (N.J. 
1980) (“‘[T]he Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for Holmes’s proverbial 
‘bad man’ who wants to know just how many corners he may cut . . . .’” (quoting Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. City of N.Y., 501 F.2d 639, 649 (2d Cir. 1974))); Havana Cent. NY2 LLC 
v. Lunney’s Pub, Inc., 852 N.Y.S.2d 32, 37 & n.1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (McGuire, J., 
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concurring in part, dissenting in part) (finding a contract provision relieving a landlord of 
liability for failure to give possession on commencement date is equivalent to term stating 
landlord is not required to give possession of the premises if unable to do so); Terrazas v. 
Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d 712, 732 n.2 (Tex. 1991) (Cornyn, J., concurring) (noting that “the 
constraints of law are not primarily designed for persons with good intentions”). 
 25. Castro-Cortez v. I.N.S., 239 F.3d 1037, 1054 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that even the 
bad man has a right to know what the penalty will be); Gray-Bey v. United States, 201 F.3d 
866, 872 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Bruchhausen, 977 F.2d 464, 469 (9th Cir. 1992) (Fernandez, J., concurring) 
(writing against bad man action in property contracts); Eugene D. ex rel. Olivia D. v. 
Karman, 889 F.2d 701, 714 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1989); Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 
774 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding, contrary to Holmes’s view in The Path of the Law that “[t]he 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean 
by the law,” Holmes, supra note 3, at 461, “there may be ‘law’ without a judicial remedy”); 
Gen. Motors, 501 F.2d at 649 (finding the Code of Professional Responsibility is not 
designed for the bad man); Delso v. Trs. for Ret. Plan For Hourly Emps. of Merck & Co., 
Inc., No. 04-3009 (AET), 2007 WL 766349, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007) (finding the Code of 
Professional Responsibility is not designed for the bad man); Norcia v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1047–48 (D. Ariz. 2000) (finding that 
when a bad man breaches a contract the only punishment is to pay damages and nothing 
else); Essex Cnty. Jail Annex Inmates v. Treffinger, 18 F. Supp. 2d 418, 437 (D.N.J. 1998) 
(citing General Motors, 501 F.2d at 649); Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 
No. 96 Civ. 1103 (MBM), 1996 WL 125641, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1996) (quoting 
Holmes, supra note 3, at 459); Secs. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 703 F. Supp. 146, 156 (D. 
Mass. 1988); Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1189, 1194 (D. 
Mass. 1985) (citing Holmes’s bad man theory and Holmes’s maxim that a breach of contract 
requires payment of damages and nothing more), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 855 F.2d 888 
(1st Cir. 1988); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 353 F. Supp. 795, 802 (W.D. Pa. 1973) 
(citing bad man in the conflict between equity and contract maxims), vacated, 491 F.2d 402 
(3d Cir. 1974). 
 26. See, e.g., ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES:  THE LIFE, WORK, AND 
LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES (2000) (providing a generally negative account of Holmes’s 
provocatively amoral approach to understanding the law and the influence of his thought in 
American jurisprudence); THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Robert W. 
Gordon ed., 1992); THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE:  THE LEGACY OF OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Steven J. Burton ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (a collection of 
essays by American and Canadian scholars on the legacy of Holmes’s famous essay, with 
particular discussion of the bad man by several contributors).  References to the bad man 
theory of law are made in too numerous a quantity to list exhaustively, but a representative 
example includes David O. Brink, Legal Interpretation, Objectivity, and Morality, in 
OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS 12, 14–15 (Brian Leiter ed., 2001); STEPHEN M. 
FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM:  AN 
INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 108 (2000); NICHOLAS L. GEORGAKOPOULOS, PRINCIPLES AND 
METHODS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS:  BASIC TOOLS FOR NORMATIVE REASONING 80–81 
(2005); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:  FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 126–27, 146 (1993). 
 27. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Descending Trail:  Holmes’ Path of the Law One 
Hundred Years Later, 49 FLA. L. REV. 353 (1997) (reviewing The Path of the Law); David 
Campbell, The Relational Constitution of Remedy:  Co-operation as the Implicit Second 
Principle of Remedies for Breach of Contract, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 455, 461–62 
(2005) (writing on the bad man and efficient breach); Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to 
Washington:  The Effect of Political Influence on Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1593 (2006) (writing on corporations acting as the bad man); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and 
Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989) [hereinafter Grey, Legal Pragmatism] 
(writing that good lawyers must themselves be bad men); Thomas C. Grey, Plotting The 
Path of the Law, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 19, 21 (1997) (noting that The Path of the Law was born 
of a speech and Holmes’s words were written to be memorable more than making their 
interrelations clear); David Howarth, Many Duties of Care—or a Duty of Care?  Notes from 
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most recently, the Supreme Court of the United States itself,28 where he has 
asserted himself in a particularly pernicious manner.29  That such an 
ominous theory has made its way to the highest levels of our judiciary 
should give us pause to reflect on this theory that now informs much of our 
law.30
 
the Underground, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 449–50 (2006) (discussing the bad man 
and Holmes’s breach of contract theory in light of tort law); Irving R. Kaufman, The Former 
Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1957) 
(writing on the professional canons of ethics and the role of the bad man in legal ethics); 
Yoram Keinan, Playing the Audit Lottery:  The Role of Penalties in the U.S. Tax Law in the 
Aftermath of Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 382 
(2006) (noting corporations and individuals act as the bad man with respect to the Tax 
Code); Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, The “Bad Man,” the Good, and the Self-Reliant, 78 
B.U. L. REV. 885 (1998) (arguing that Holmes’s bad man is a bad metaphor and is more 
profitably replaced by the Emersonian self-reliant individual); Luban, supra note 
 
1 
(discussing Holmes’s prediction theory, morality in the law, and the relationship between 
punitive damages and the bad man); Vicki Lawrence MacDougall, The Supremes’ 
“Reflections” on Punitive Damages:  The Constitutional Dimension of Tort Reform, 61 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 864, 878–79 (2007) (mentioning the Supreme Court’s use of the 
bad man in discussing punitive damages in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker); Miller, supra note 
11 (discussing the role of morals in the legal profession and the place of the bad man in law); 
Liam Murphy, Better To See the Law This Way, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1088 (2008) (supporting 
lawyers who take the bad man view to better represent clients); Richard A. Posner, The Path 
Away from the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1039 (1997) (analyzing the importance of Holmes 
and The Path of the Law 100 years after its publication); David J. Seipp, Holmes’s Path, 77 
B.U. L. REV. 515 (1997) (reviewing The Path of The Law 100 years after publication); David 
Simon & Gerald A. Novack, Limiting the Buyer’s Market Damages to Lost Profits:  A 
Challenge to the Enforceability of Market Contracts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1395, 1433 (1979) 
(“Perhaps the best way to appraise the court’s foreseeability theory is to see how it would 
operate in the hands of Justice Holmes’ classic ‘bad man.’” (citing Holmes, supra note 3)); 
Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of 
Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 9–10 (2005) (finding the bad man in the context of 
marriage and divorce); William Twining, The Bad Man Revisited, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 275 
(1973) (exploring the bad man as one standpoint providing a useful tool of juristic analysis); 
Twining, supra note 10 (decrying unscholarly and inaccurate characterizations of the bad 
man and arguing he was not meant as a role model but as a device to speak about the 
difference between law and morality, a discussion which remains controversial); Louise 
Weinberg, Holmes’ Failure, 96 MICH. L. REV. 691 (1997) (commenting on Holmes’s legacy 
and work, including The Path of the Law); W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as 
Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167 (2005) (discussing the bad man and the role of 
lawyers in the Enron, Global Crossing, WorldCom and other corporate financial scandals); 
T. Patrick Gumkowski, Comment, Protecting the Integrity of the Rhode Island Judicial 
System and Assuring an Adequate Remedy for Victims of Spoliation:  Why an Independent 
Cause of Action for the Spoliation of Evidence is the Solution, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 795, 815–16 (2005) (discussing the present state of Rhode Island spoliation law and 
how it encourages a bad man reading of the statute); Jay E. Rivlin, Note, Recognizing an 
Independent Tort Action Will Spoil a Spoliator’s Splendor, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1003 (1998) 
(offering a solution to the issue of insufficient punishment of the spoliation of evidence and 
to prevent bad man behavior); Matthew T. Sanderson, Note, Voodoo Economics:  A Look 
Abroad for a Supply-Side Solution to America’s Campaign-Finance Riddle, 41 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 937, 943 (2008) (finding the bad man in campaign-finance). 
 28. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2627 (2008) (finding that punitive 
damages should not be so high as to prevent an agent—like the bad man himself—from 
being able to predict the cost of violating the law). 
 29. See infra Part II.C. 
 30. It should be noted that, while the bad man is typically viewed in a negative light, 
there are times in which he has been used by courts in what many would agree is a positive 
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So who, exactly, is the bad man, and what, if anything, can he offer to the 
study of law? 
Many commentators have viewed the bad man as a basic extension of 
Holmes himself;31 that is to say, as a gruff character indifferent to matters 
of justice, and either apathetic or downright opposed to the establishment of 
any connection between law and morality.32  And, although Holmes’s own 
views on the matter were much more nuanced,33 Holmes himself was at 
least partly to blame for these depictions.  For instance, Holmes encouraged 
his audience to understand law as the bad man himself would understand it, 
and that meant, first and foremost, to “dispel a confusion between morality 
and law”34 by purging the legal vernacular of all words of moral 
significance.  In Holmes’s words:  “For my own part, I often doubt whether 
it would not be a gain if every word of moral significance could be 
banished from the law altogether, and other words adopted which should 
convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law.”35
 
way.  For instance, some courts have cited this theory for the proposition that individuals in 
our society are not allowed to act as the bad man would. See Holmquist, 36 F.3d at 160 
(using statutory construction to avoid promoting a bad man reading of the statute); 
Bruchhausen, 977 F.2d at 469 (Fernandez, J., concurring) (warning against allowing bad 
man to take property, regardless of bad man’s willingness to pay market value for the 
property); Eugene, 889 F.2d at 711–15 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (arguing against the bad man 
and the positivist position); Gen. Motors, 501 F.2d at 649 (holding the Rules of Professional 
Conduct are not meant to be read from the perspective of the bad man); Delso, 2007 WL 
766349, at *5 (“[T]he Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for Holmes 
proverbial ‘bad man’ . . . .” (quoting Gen. Motors, 501 F.2d at 649)); People v. Peevy, 953 
P.2d 1212, 1214 (Cal. 1998) (holding law enforcement agents are not allowed to act as the 
bad man and choose when to obey the rules with regard to an accused’s rights); id. at 1230 
(Mosk, J., concurring) (finding police officers and agencies are not free to act as the bad man 
would and cannot choose whether to give Miranda rights and thus make defendant 
statements admissible, or not give Miranda and make defendant statements inadmissible); 
Cuevas v. Royal D’Iberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346, 356–57 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that when conduct is proscribed by law, the state should never act as the 
bad man). 
 
 31. Seipp, supra note 27, at 552 (“Holmes was ‘the bad man.’”). 
 32. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes’ Positivism—An Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV. 
929, 932 (1951). 
 33. See, e.g., ALAN CALNAN, A REVISIONIST HISTORY OF TORT LAW:  FROM HOLMESIAN 
REALISM TO NEOCLASSICAL RATIONALISM 22 (2005) (arguing that Holmes’s theory “depicted 
a system that was both principled and policy-driven, faulty and fault-free and moral and 
amoral, all at the same time”).  For a more in-depth discussion of Holmes’s views, see Part 
III, infra. 
 34. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459; see also id. at 458 (“One of the many evil effects of 
the confusion between legal and moral ideas . . . is that theory is apt to get the cart before the 
horse, and to consider the right or the duty as something existing apart from and independent 
of the consequences of its breach, to which certain sanctions are added afterward.”); id. at 
464. 
 35. Id. at 464.  Indeed, while discussing the “confusion between legal and moral ideas,” 
particularly in the area of contract law, Holmes famously remarked that  
[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay 
damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else. . . . But such a mode of looking 
at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as 
much ethics into the law as they can. 
Id. at 462.  As I discuss in Part III, however, Holmes was not against morality informing law, 
and understood too well that the legitimacy of law itself rested on public morality.  Holmes’s 
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But requiring one to leave morality at justice’s door probably seemed as 
inauspicious then as it does now, and it is but one short step from such a 
statement to the now widely accepted view that Holmes’s bad man theory 
of law stands for the principle that lawyers, judges, and lawmakers should 
not concern themselves at all with matters of morality when advising 
clients, interpreting a statute, or enacting new legislation.36
To see why, let us examine how a bad man might understand a concept 
such as “duty,” a term laden with both moral and legal significance.  In the 
words of Holmes:  “[W]hat does [a legal duty] mean to a bad man?  Mainly, 
and in the first place, a prophecy that if he does certain things he will be 
subjected to disagreeable consequences by way of imprisonment or 
compulsory payment of money.”
 
37
Holmes continues: 
 
What significance is there in calling one taking right and another wrong 
from the point of view of the law?  It does not matter, so far as the given 
consequence, the compulsory payment, is concerned, whether the act to 
which it is attached is described in terms of praise or in terms of blame, or 
whether the law purports to prohibit it or to allow it.  If it matters at all, 
still speaking from the bad man’s point of view, it must be because in one 
case and not in the other some further disadvantages, or at least some 
further consequences, are attached to the act by the law.38
In short, 
 
[t]o a Holmesian bad man, law is a system of prices, and only material 
prices matter.  The law’s price may include damages, an injunction, a 
 
point in making this comment is that legal ideas could be better understood if legal and 
ethical concepts, especially those concepts unfortunate enough to be identified with the same 
linguistic marking (e.g., the word “duty”), were disentangled. 
 36. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 27, at 420; Hart, supra note 32, at 932 (replying to 
Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1951), 
Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr. states:  “The conclusion . . . is that law is something entirely 
separate from morals, and that to see law truly we must look at it the way a bad man does.  
Why that helps, unless to make us more effective counselors of evil, I have never 
understood.”).  Professor Albert W. Alschuler is deeply critical of what he perceives as 
Holmes’s project to separate morals from the law: 
At the conclusion of a tour of Holmes’ dark, elegant, engaging, and destructive 
essay, however, the praise seems flawed.  Morton Horwitz’s judgment appears 
more appropriate:  “With ‘The Path of the Law’ Holmes pushed American legal 
thought into the twentieth century.”  The only flaw in this pronouncement is that 
Horwitz apparently meant it as a compliment to Holmes, to the century, and to 
American law. 
Alschuler, supra note 27, at 420 (quoting MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960:  THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 142 (1992)). 
 37. Holmes, supra note 3, at 461; see also 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS:  THE 
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874–1932, at 212–
13 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942) (“So we get up the empty substratum, a right, to pretend 
to account for the fact that the courts will act in a certain way. . . . I think our morally tinted 
words have caused a great deal of confused thinking.”); Holmes, supra note 3, at 458 (“[A] 
legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he 
will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court;—and so of a legal 
right.”). 
 38. Holmes, supra note 3, at 461. 
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contempt citation, a fine, a prison term, or even death by hanging.  
Nevertheless, a man tough enough to pay the price always has the option 
of noncompliance with the law’s directives.39
Indeed, juxtaposing Holmes’s bad man view of law with an alternative 
“good man” view of law may help bring into sharper focus what many 
believe to be at stake in adopting Holmes’s judicial philosophy.  A good 
man, as Holmes stated, will rely on his “conscience” to guide his behavior 
and will presumably do the right thing—not because it is illegal to do 
otherwise—but simply because it is the right thing to do.  When deciding 
whether to obey a particular law, for example, the good man will not look 
to the penalty that may be imposed in the case of violation.  Rather, the 
good man will look to the rightness or wrongness of the action at issue and 
will undertake just actions even where it is unprofitable to do so (e.g., 
performing a losing contract) while violating unjust laws without regard to 
the penalty imposed (e.g., Jim Crow laws). 
 
Because the bad man is motivated by external sanctions, while the good 
man is motivated by internal conscience, a lawyer, judge, or legislator 
advising a client, interpreting a statute, or making a new law may behave 
quite differently depending on whether he or she has the good man or bad 
man in mind.  For instance, a lawmaker with the good man before his mind 
would likely attempt to “establish wholesome laws in a state” in order to 
make “his citizens virtuous,”40
Putting aside Holmes’s own intentions for the moment,
 whereas a legislator with the bad man before 
his mind would not worry much about appealing to his constituent’s hearts 
by enacting laws to make his citizens more virtuous, but would likely 
appeal to their minds by attaching sufficiently large penalties to laws 
deemed important enough to enforce. 
41 one may have a 
hard time seeing what the “bad man” theory of law, at least as it is 
commonly understood today, has to offer at all to legal analysis, especially 
when juxtaposed with the more benign and noble “good man” theory of 
law.  One commentator, for example, described Holmes’s bad man theory 
of law as one that would, if widely adopted, “breed disrespect for law by 
encouraging the public to act like Holmes’ bad man,” whereas a “good 
man” view would encourage individuals to uphold “an obligation to 
conform to a norm.”42
 
 39. Alschuler, supra note 
  And, in helping their clients behave in this manner, 
27, at 412. 
 40. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. III, ch. IX, 1280b, at 82 (Ernest Rhys ed., 
William Ellis trans., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1912) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (“[W]hosoever endeavours to 
establish wholesome laws in a state, attends to the virtues and the vices of each individual 
who composes it; from whence it is evident, that the first care of him who would found a city 
. . . must be to have his citizens virtuous; for otherwise it is merely an alliance for self-
defence; differing from those of the same cast which are made between different people only 
in place:  for law is an agreement and a pledge . . . between the citizens of their intending to 
do justice to each other . . . .”). 
 41. I discuss Holmes’s intentions in greater detail in Part III. 
 42. Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 687 (1995) 
(“The prediction model, if widely accepted, would breed disrespect for law by encouraging 
the public to act like Holmes’ bad man, understanding the law as imposing an obligation not 
to get caught, rather than an obligation to conform to a norm.”). 
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lawyers advising the bad man, unlike those advising the good man, would 
in time become “more effective counsellors of evil,”43 and with enough 
practice, would help bring about Holmes’s sinister desire to “destroy their 
morality and faith.”44
Quite a few, as it turns out.  To examine more closely the bad man’s 
contribution to modern jurisprudence, this Article examines the bad man 
theory’s influence in three important legal fields:  contract law, tort law, and 
punitive damages jurisprudence.  In each of these fields, this Article draws 
heavily on the work done by law and economics scholars, who have 
probably made the most use of Holmes’s bad man.
  So again, what benefits can the bad man view of law 
offer to legal analysis? 
45
II.  FROM HOLMES’S THEORY OF THE BAD MAN TO THE BAD MAN’S 
THEORY OF LAW 
  By doing so, we will 
see the strong influence the bad man has had not only on academicians, but 
on judges deciding actual disputes, making it even more important that they 
get the theory right. 
What constitutes the law?  You will find some text writers telling you that 
it is something different from what is decided by the courts[,] . . . that it is 
a system of reason, that it is a deduction from principles of ethics or 
admitted axioms or what not, which may or may not coincide with the 
decisions.  But if we take the view of our friend the bad man we shall find 
that he does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he 
does want to know what the . . . courts are likely to do in fact.  I am much 
of his mind.  The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and 
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law. 
 —Oliver Wendell Holmes46
 
 
This part of the Article traces the influence of Holmes’s bad man theory 
in three important areas of our law.  Section A traces the development of 
Holmes’s bad man theory of contracts from its inception in Holmes’s article 
 
 43. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 32, at 932 (replying to Howe, supra note 36:  “The 
conclusion . . . is that law is something entirely separate from morals, and that to see law 
truly we must look at it the way a bad man does.  Why that helps, unless to make us more 
effective counsellors of evil, I have never understood.”). 
 44. See Miller, supra note 11, at 231 (claiming “Justice Holmes desired most of all that 
lawyers disconnect themselves from morality—to destroy their morality and faith”). 
 45. In fact, Holmes’s bad man approach to law was probably carried to its highest level 
of abstraction in the writings of Ronald Coase. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19–28 (1960); see also Nancy A. Weston, The Metaphysics of 
Modern Tort Theory, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 919, 931 n.15 (1994) (arguing that Coase’s seminal 
article “presents an essentially Holmesian understanding of law as without fundamental 
obligatoriness:  Holmes’s famous proposal to understand law from the position of the ‘bad 
man’ follows this reasoning, as does his treatment of contract as presenting an option to 
perform or to breach and pay”).  Through Coase, the bad man theory of law has spread to the 
four-corners of the law in large part through the law and economics movement. See, e.g., The 
Fire of Truth:  A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932–1970, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 163, 226 (1983) (“[Coase’s] social cost article, as everybody knows—it’s silly to 
dwell on it—is basic to the whole economic analysis of law.” (statement of Richard Posner)). 
 46. Holmes, supra note 3, at 460–61. 
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The Path of the Law to its modern development and use by judges and law 
and economics scholars alike.  Section A also considers some of the main 
objections asserted against this theory by its critics, paying particular 
attention to the manner in which Holmes’s theory is understood today.  
Section B follows the same procedure set forth in section A with respect to 
tort law, and section C focuses on the most recent application of Holmes’s 
theory, in the realm of punitive damages, where the Supreme Court of the 
United States has embraced (a corrupted version of) Holmes’s bad man 
theory of law.  It is important to note that this part of the Article is primarily 
focused on how Holmes’s bad man theory of law has been understood and 
developed by scholars and applied by judges.  I reserve for Part III a deeper 
exploration of Holmes’s own thoughts on the issue, which have not only 
been inadequately developed, but which provide a much deeper and more 
insightful theory of law capable of helping us better understand how our 
law actually operates and how our law ought to be better structured in the 
future. 
A.  The Bad Man’s Theory of Contracts:  From Pacta Sunt Servanda and 
the Sanctity of Contracts to Efficient Breach 
The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you 
must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else . . . .  But such 
a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it 
advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can. 
 —Oliver Wendell Holmes47
 
 
Although Holmes’s bad man theory of law has come to permeate Anglo-
American legal thought,48 perhaps nowhere has the bad man had more 
influence than in the realm of contracts, where scholars and judges alike 
have spilled so much ink fleshing out and giving shape to Holmes’s vision 
that it is difficult to think or write about contract law without the bad man 
standing over one’s shoulders, monitoring one’s action, and attempting to 
influence one’s thought.49
 
 47. Id. at 462.  Holmes was remarkably consistent in his thinking, and had begun to 
develop this view some sixteen years previously in his groundbreaking work, The Common 
Law. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 236 (Mark DeWolfe Howe 
ed., 1963) (1881) (“It is true that in some instances equity does what is called compelling 
specific performance.  But . . . [t]his remedy is an exceptional one.  The only universal 
consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if 
the promised event does not come to pass.  In every case it leaves him free from interference 
until the time for fulfillment has gone by, and therefore free to break his contract if he 
chooses.”); see also id. at 247–48 (“If we look at the law as it would be regarded by one who 
had no scruples against doing anything which he could do without incurring legal 
consequences, it is obvious that the main consequence attached by the law to a contract is a 
greater or less possibility of having to pay money.  The only question from the purely legal 
point of view is whether the promisor will be compelled to pay.”). 
  But how, exactly, does Holmes’s bad man 
 48. See supra Part I. 
 49. See Norcia v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1048 
(D. Ariz. 2000) (noting that the “‘bad man’ theory of contracts permeates American common 
law”). 
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approach contract law, and what, if anything, can his views tell us about the 
way Holmes thinks we are to understand contract law? 
Perhaps the best way of understanding the bad man’s view of contract 
law is to contrast it with the way his counterpart, the good man, understands 
the subject.  Unlike the bad man, the good man performs his promise not 
because of the benefits he might receive, nor because of the costs he might 
incur, but because, quite simply, performing one’s promise is the right thing 
to do.50  And because the good man is guided by the moral law emanating 
from within, rather than the positive law imposed from without, he believes 
that moral principles governing the institution of promise-keeping (e.g., the 
idea that “there is something inherently despicable” about not keeping one’s 
promises) should guide, or at the very least inform, the legal principles 
governing contract law (e.g., “a properly organized society should not 
tolerate this”).51
The bad man, in contrast, sees matters quite differently.  Holmes, in his 
monumental speech,
 
52
Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest 
than in the law of contract.  Among other things, here again the so called 
primary rights and duties are invested with a mystic significance beyond 
what can be assigned and explained.  The duty to keep a contract at 
common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not 
keep it,—and nothing else. . . . But such a mode of looking at the matter 
stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much 
ethics into the law as they can.
 famously dismissed this type of moralistic thinking 
as unhelpful and confusing, and invited his audience to understand contract 
law as the bad man himself would understand it.  In language now 
immortalized in the contract law canon, Holmes wrote: 
53
All of the bad men in attendance must have nodded with wild enthusiasm 
at Holmes’s words.  Holmes is undoubtedly right that the bad man, if he is 
true to his name, would not understand the notion of “duty” in the same 
moral sense that a good man would understand such a concept and would 
probably look at the matter in much the same way as Holmes suggests.  But 
the last sentence of Holmes’s quoted speech is more problematic, for it 
 
 
 50. Professor Charles Fried refers to this as the “promise principle,” which constitutes 
“the moral basis of contract law” by imposing on individuals “obligations where none 
existed before.” CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE:  A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION 1, 8 (1981) (“By promising we transform a choice that was morally neutral into 
one that is morally compelled.”).  This same idea was discussed by Professor Morris R. 
Cohen in his seminal piece, The Basis of Contract, and dubbed the “sanctity of promises” 
approach. See Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 571–75 
(1933). 
 51. Cohen, supra note 50, at 571; see also FRIED, supra note 50, at 16 (“An individual is 
morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally invoked a convention 
whose function it is to give grounds—moral grounds—for another to expect the promised 
performance.”); Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies—Efficiency, Equity, 
and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 111 (1981) (“[I]t should be wrong to 
break a contract.”). 
 52. See Holmes, supra note 3. 
 53. Id. at 462; see supra note 47. 
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appears to cast its net beyond the bad man himself, and seems to suggest 
that all of us, and especially those among us who view contract law from 
the good man’s perspective, are wrong about our views.  But in what way 
might we be wrong?  Is Holmes’s argument that the good man does not 
behave according to moral precepts?  This seems unlikely.  Or, was Holmes 
arguing that the good man may understand law in this manner, but that 
others do not?  This might be closer to the truth, but still says nothing about 
how contract law ought to be understood by everyone else.  Or, was 
Holmes’s point that others may also understand contract law as the good 
man does, but that courts do not?  This would seem to be relevant as a 
descriptive matter, but would be inadequate to those who would seek to 
reform contract law for the better.  Perhaps this was Holmes’s point—that 
contract law was better off without these moral infusions. 
What Holmes meant by these words, and whether he was speaking 
normatively or descriptively, is a matter of much debate,54 which I take up 
in greater detail in Part III.  What is not in debate, however, is the enormous 
influence these words, as interpreted by generations of contracts scholars 
and judges, have had on the subsequent history of contract law,55
 
 54. See, e.g., Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach 
and Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2000) (arguing that others have 
misunderstood Holmes’s bad man theory of contract law by linking it to the “towering legal 
authority of Holmes,” whereas, in fact, Holmes “is incorrectly cast as articulating the idea of 
a right to breach a contract”); see also Willard T. Barbour, The “Right” to Break a Contract, 
16 MICH. L. REV. 106, 109 (1917) (“[N]either the history of the common law nor logic 
sustains the proposition that there is no legal obligation to perform a contract or, conversely, 
that there is a right to break a contract.”); Richard Hyland, Life, Death, and Contract, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 204, 207 (1995) (“[S]o much nonsense has been written about [Holmes’s] 
thought, including the especially idiotic notion that Holmes adhered to a ‘bad man’s’ view of 
the law, according to which our only obligations derive from a calculated prediction of 
whether, in a particular situation, a court would impose a sanction.  Posner, citing Holmes, 
developed this idea with stubborn narrow-mindedness into the theory of efficient breach.”). 
 and it is 
 55. See, e.g., Clark A. Remington, Intentional Interference with Contract and the 
Doctrine of Efficient Breach:  Fine Tuning the Notion of the Contract Breacher as 
Wrongdoer, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 645, 647 (1999) (“The law has come to regard the obligation 
to perform a contract as being generally equivalent to an option to perform or pay damages.  
Holmes saw the matter this way more than one hundred years ago.”). 
Some examples of judges invoking Holmes’s bad man view of contract law include 
United States v. Bruchhausen, 977 F.2d 464, 469 (9th Cir. 1992) (Fernandez, J., concurring) 
(acknowledging that although “Holmes’s ‘bad man’ theory of the law . . . [is] realistic in 
some sense,” it should not apply to support the idea of efficient theft in property law (citing 
Holmes, supra note 3, at 459–62)); Norcia v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United 
States, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1047–48 (D. Ariz. 2000) (acknowledging that the “‘bad man’ 
theory of contracts permeates American common law.  That is, a contracting party usually 
cannot demand performance of a valid contract; rather, the defaulting party must either 
perform or pay damages equivalent to the value of the promised performance.  Under this 
approach to contract theory, it follows that when performance becomes uneconomic, a 
contracting party will not infrequently break a contract, preferring instead to pay damages,” 
and finding that when a bad man breaches a contract, the only punishment is to pay damages, 
and nothing else (citing Holmes, supra note 3, at 462)); Redgrave v. Boston Symphony 
Orchestra, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1189, 1194 (D. Mass. 1985) (recognizing that “[t]he suggested 
freedom to break a contract and suffer liability only for the legally recognized damages is 
within the scope of the idea often referred to as Holmes’ bad man theory of contract law—
that one who is willing to pay the penalty of such damages as the law assesses is free to 
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this effect I am most concerned with here.  According to the standard 
interpretation, Holmes meant to suggest that a promisor, upon entering into 
a contract, is not obligated to uphold his promissory commitment,56 but 
rather has a choice between performing, on the one hand, and breaching 
while paying money damages, on the other.57
 
break the contract and pay” (citing Holmes, supra note 
  The truth is that the bad man, 
3, at 461–62)), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, 855 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1988); Rochez Bros. Inc. v. Rhoades, 353 F. Supp. 795, 802 
(W.D. Pa. 1973) (recognizing the conflict between “the rule that equity regards as done that 
which ought to be done” and “the ‘bad man’ theory of Justice Holmes that would regard the 
obligation of a contract as merely the liability to pay damages for its breach, which might 
well be less than the profitability of non-performance” (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, 
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 173–75 (1920))), vacated, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1973); Estate of 
Murrell v. Quin, 454 So. 2d 437, 440 (Miss. 1984) (Robertson, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (examining the contrasting purposes of equity and contract law and noting 
that “[f]uzzy moral notions of right and wrong, good and bad are irrelevant.  That persons 
not parties to the contract may suffer loss is of no concern of the law. . . . Persons potentially 
affected who have failed to act to protect their interests sit idle at their peril.  The law is 
wholly indifferent to non-legal consequences.  It would allow one to think and behave as the 
proverbial Holmesean bad man to his heart’s content” (citing Holmes, supra note 3, at 459)); 
Havana Central NY2 LLC v. Lunney’s Pub, Inc., 852 N.Y.S.2d 32, 37 & n.1 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2007) (McGuire, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (lamenting the fact that, “[a]fter a 
perhaps too brief struggle, I have succumbed to the temptation to invoke Holmes’ ‘bad man’ 
theory of law” in finding that a contract provision relieving a landlord of liability for failure 
to give possession on commencement date is equivalent to term stating landlord is not 
required to give possession of the premises if unable to do so (citing Holmes, supra note 3, 
at 462)). 
 56. Alternatively, many scholars understand Holmes to be stating that a promisor may or 
may not be morally obligated to perform his promise, but dismiss such considerations as 
legally irrelevant.  This, for instance, was the view of Judge Isaac Parker, who famously 
wrote well before Holmes that although some “disgraceful” promisors (“men of a different 
character,” he calls them) may refuse to perform promises “they are bound in foro 
conscientioe to perform,” the law will nevertheless not get involved, but leave the 
enforcement of such promises to that “interior forum, as the tribunal of conscience has been 
aptly called.” Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207, 209–10 (1825).  The court went on to 
note: 
What a man ought to do, generally he ought to be made to do, whether he promise 
or refuse. . . . Without doubt there are great interests of society which justify 
withholding the coercive arm of the law from these duties of imperfect obligation, 
as they are called; imperfect, not because they are less binding upon the 
conscience than those which are called perfect, but because the wisdom of the 
social law does not impose sanctions upon them. 
Id. at 210–11; see also Estate of Murrell, 454 So. 2d at 440 (Robertson, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part). 
 57. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and 
the Just Compensation Principle:  Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of 
Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 558 (1977) (“The modern law of contract damages 
is based on the premise that a contractual obligation is not necessarily an obligation to 
perform, but rather an obligation to choose between performance and compensatory 
damages.”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 118 (4th ed. 1992) 
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW] (arguing that a “voluntary but . . . 
efficient” breach “give[s] point to Holmes’s dictum that it is not the policy of the law to 
compel adherence to contracts but only to require each party to choose between performing 
in accordance with the contract and compensating the other party for any injury resulting 
from a failure to perform”); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 58 
(2003) (“Holmes pointed out that in a regime in which the sanction for breach of contract is 
merely an award of compensatory damages to the victim, the entire practical effect of 
signing a contract is that by doing so one obtains an option to break it.”); Clayton P. Gillette, 
2011] FINDING THE GOOD IN HOLMES’S BAD MAN 2085 
of course, does see matters this way, and will probably, as a descriptive 
matter, choose his course of conduct based not on moral considerations, but 
by performing a cost-benefit analysis.58
Although some scholars lament the fact that morality does not play a 
larger role in Holmes’s theory,
 
59 most scholars (even if only reluctantly) 
concede that modern contract law is essentially Holmesian60 and ultimately 
does “exclude[] considerations of morality”61 in order to “advance the 
objective of economic efficiency.”62  Today, the most ardent supporters of 
Holmes’s theory are those working within the law and economics 
paradigm,63 who have applied Holmes’s bad man view of contracts with 
particular force to the modern theory of efficient breach,64
 
Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619, 658–59 (“Professor 
Posner suggests that the modern theory of contract damages . . . views a contract as an 
undertaking to perform or pay damages for nonperformance . . . .”); Remington, supra note 
 which acts as the 
55, at 647; Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against 
Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1429 n.1 (2004) (“It is well 
known that contract damages effectively give the promisor an option between performing the 
promise or breaching and paying damages.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Norcia, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1048. 
 59. See, e.g., Linzer, supra note 51, at 138 n.189 (noting that Holmes’s rebellion against 
the will theory of contract law may explain his “deprecation of ethics in the law,” but “does 
not justify it”). 
 60. See, e.g., Remington, supra note 55, at 647.  
 61. Linzer, supra note 51, at 111; see, e.g., Estate of Murrell, 454 So. 2d at 440 
(Robertson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“Fuzzy moral notions of right and 
wrong, good and bad are irrelevant. . . . The law is wholly indifferent to non-legal 
consequences.  It would allow one to think and behave as the proverbial Holmesean bad man 
to his heart’s content.”). 
 62. Linzer, supra note 51, at 111 (arguing that although “it should be wrong to break a 
contract,” contract law “has emphasized an approach that excludes considerations of 
morality and is said to advance the objective of economic efficiency”); see also Patton v. 
Mid-Continent Sys., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) (“Even if the breach is 
deliberate, it is not necessarily blameworthy.  The promisor may simply have discovered that 
his performance is worth more to someone else.  If so, efficiency is promoted by allowing 
him to break his promise, provided he makes good the promisee’s actual losses.”). But see 
Cynthia A. Williams, A Tale of Two Trajectories, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1659 (2006) 
(commenting that “much of society and many religious and philosophical traditions would 
disagree with Judge Posner’s view, arguing that breaking a promise simply because one has 
later realized it is to one’s personal advantage to do so is morally blameworthy in most 
instances”). 
 63. Here, again, Holmes’s views have proved to be remarkably prescient.  In the same 
speech in which he created the bad man, Holmes acknowledged that although “the black-
letter man may be the man of the present” with respect to the “rational study of law,” “the 
man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.” Holmes, supra note 
3, at 469. 
 64. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude:  Of Property, 
Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 633 (2008) 
(arguing that Holmes’s statement “has since been developed into the ‘efficient breach’ 
theory of contractual remedies, which is based on the argument that in situations where a 
promisor’s profits from a potential breach are in excess of the promisee’s loss from such 
breach, the breach should be encouraged (or at the very least, not deterred)—with no 
restraints whatsoever imposed by morality”); see also Campbell, supra note 27, at 461–62 
(“[T]he idea of an efficient breach which allows the defendant to maximise his utilities is 
traceable to Holmes’ famous observation that:  ‘[T]he only universal consequence of a 
legally binding promise is that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised 
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bad man’s shibboleth65 in distinguishing those who would invoke 
morality66 when determining one’s contractual obligations from those who 
would not.67
For instance, the strongest proponents of efficient breach theory not only 
acknowledge, as a descriptive point, the promisor’s right to breach a 
contract where doing so is efficient,
 
68 but even go so far as to claim that the 
law should encourage, as a normative matter, such breaches.69
 
event does not come to pass.  [The law of contract] leaves [the promisor] free to break his 
contract if he chooses.’  This observation smacks of the cynicism of Holmes’s ‘bad 
man’ . . . .” (quoting HOLMES, supra note 
  Putting 
aside for the moment Holmes’s own views on the matter, it is in large part 
due to such statements that many scholars have opposed this theory as 
47, at 236) (citing Holmes, supra note 3, at 459)); 
Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–2 (1989) (“The 
modern theory of ‘efficient breach’ is a variation and systematic extension of Holmes’s 
outlook on contractual remedy.”); Grey, Legal Pragmatism, supra note 27, at 832 
(“[Holmes’s] formulations represented a breakthrough, the implications of which would not 
be fully absorbed for several generations.  At the outset of his career as a legal theorist, he 
planted the germ of the whole modern analysis of tort and contract in terms of risk 
allocation, later embodied in such notions as loss spreading, cost internalization, and 
efficient breach.”); Avery Wiener Katz, The Option Element in Contracting, 90 VA. L. REV. 
2187, 2202 (2004) (“[T]he modern-day economic elaboration of Holmes’s theory [is] the so-
called theory of efficient breach.”); Perillo, supra note 54, at 1090 (“[I]t has become 
commonplace to tie the economists’ notion of efficient breach to the towering legal authority 
of Holmes . . . .”). 
 65. The term itself seems to have been first coined in 1977 by Professors Charles J. 
Goetz and Robert E. Scott. See Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal 
Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 381, 384 n.11 (2005) (“It appears that the term ‘efficient breach’ may have been 
coined, at least in print, by Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott.” (citing Goetz & Scott, 
supra note 57)). 
 66. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 50, at 16 (“An individual is morally bound to keep his 
promises because he has intentionally invoked a convention whose function it is to give 
grounds—moral grounds—for another to expect the promised performance.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Craig S. Warkol, Note, Resolving The Paradox Between Legal Theory and 
Legal Fact:  The Judicial Rejection of the Theory of Efficient Breach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 
321, 345 (1998) (“The theory of efficient breach encourages the parties to the contract and 
the reviewing judge to look at the contract without moral considerations.”). 
 68. Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.). But see 
Williams, supra note 62, at 1659. 
 69. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 57, at 119 (“[I]n some 
cases a party [to a contract] is tempted to break his contract simply because his profit from 
breach would exceed his [expected] profit from completion of the contract.  If [his profit 
from breach] would also exceed the expected profit to the other party from completion of the 
contract, and if damages are limited to the loss of [expected] profit, there will be an incentive 
to commit a breach.  But there should be.”); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, 
Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970) 
(“Repudiation of obligations should be encouraged where the promisor is able to profit from 
his default after placing his promisee in as good a position as he would have occupied had 
performance been rendered.”); Remington, supra note 55 (arguing that the law encourages 
efficient breaches, except where those breaches are or should be wrongful). But see 
Friedmann, supra note 64, at 18 (arguing that the law of contract has evolved away from 
recognizing efficient breach); Perillo, supra note 54, at 1093–98. 
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morally wanting70 and, worse yet, damaging to the institution of promise-
keeping.71
The previous analysis seems to suggest that one can either accept 
Holmes’s bad man view of contract law and hold that morality is and ought 
to be irrelevant to a proper understanding of this subject, or can find, along 
with the good man, that one cannot properly understand contract law 
without acknowledging its moral underpinnings.  What seems clear, 
however, is that one cannot simultaneously hold the views of both the good 
man and the bad man.  Either morality is relevant to contract law, or it is 
not.  If it is relevant, it would seem that the good man’s approach is better, 
and Holmes’s bad man may have little to offer to the institution of contract 
law, except perhaps the need for better enforcement.  If the bad man is 
right, however, it raises a number of questions regarding what, if anything, 
we the people should do about it.  If, contrary to what was stated earlier, 
 
 
 70. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel:  
Contract Law and the “Invisible Handshake”, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 942 (1985) 
(describing a society “in which people can confidently rely on each other” as “morally 
superior to the state of constrained avarice depicted by ‘bad man’ theories of legal 
obligation”); Friedmann, supra note 64, at 3–4 (noting that even Posner by 1986 had begun 
to distinguish and decry “opportunistic breach” from efficient breach, and pointing out that 
“[i]t is not explained why opportunistic breaches should be discouraged even if they are 
efficient.  Is it because they are morally reprehensible?” (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 79 et seq., 105–06 (3d ed. 1986))); Linzer, supra note 51; Ian 
R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract:  Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947, 963–65 
(1982) (likening efficient breach of contract to efficient theft of property, and rejecting both 
on moral grounds).  I should note that the theory of efficient breach has also been attacked 
on non-moral grounds.  For an examination of some of these grounds, see generally Marco J. 
Jimenez, The Value of a Promise:  A Utilitarian Approach to Contract Law Remedies, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 59 (2008). 
 71. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 42, at 687 (“The prediction model, if widely accepted, 
would breed disrespect for law by encouraging the public to act like Holmes’ bad man, 
understanding the law as imposing an obligation not to get caught, rather than an obligation 
to conform to a norm.  To be sure, contract law includes a doctrine of efficient breach, under 
which a contract to do X is understood as imposing an obligation to do X or pay the resulting 
damages from not doing X.”); Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer—A Brief Informal 
History of a Myth with Some Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169, 1201 (2009) 
(“[T]he growth of economism as an academic mode of thinking about law devalues any 
conception of law as expressing norms or public purposes.  Lawyers influenced by the 
‘efficient breach’ theories of legal economics theorize Holmes’s hypothetical ‘bad man’ as 
Everyman . . . [which allows parties to violate the law] ‘when violations are profitable.’” 
(quoting Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender 
Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1168 n.36 (1982); Holmes, supra note 3, at 459)).  There is 
even some concern that this bad man view of contracts, through the doctrine of efficient 
breach, may be spreading to the realm of public law. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, 
Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1327–28 
(1998) (“The efficient breach concept of statutory and regulatory law, which is based on an 
understanding of law as a series of prices established for the ‘right’ to violate the law, has 
evolved as a direct extension of the efficient breach of contract theory. . . . [Although] 
‘Holmes’ “bad man” understanding of contract law has become so descriptively accurate that 
few would contest the notion of a “right” to breach a contract,’ this insight about private law, 
even if it were true, says nothing about whether one also has a ‘right’ to breach public, 
statutory law simply by assuming a similar Holmesian equivalence between performance 
and paying damages.” (quoting Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law:  An 
Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1559 (1995))). 
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both views are correct, then it seems that a reworking or reinterpretation of 
Holmes’s views are in order.72
B.  The Bad Man’s Theory of Torts:  From the Duty of a Reasonable Person 
to the Cost-Benefit Analysis of Homo Economicus 
  For the time being, however, let us turn our 
attention to the bad man’s view of tort law to see how scholars and courts 
have developed Holmes’s theory in this area of our law. 
The law talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and intent, and 
negligence, and so forth, and nothing is easier, or, I may say, more 
common in legal reasoning, than to take these words in their moral sense, 
at some stage of the argument, and so to drop into fallacy. . . . I think that 
commonly malice, intent, and negligence mean only that the danger was 
manifest to a greater or less degree, under the circumstances known to the 
actor . . . . 
 — Oliver Wendell Holmes73
 
 
Just as Holmes’s bad man paved the way towards a new understanding of 
contract law, he likewise paved the way in tort law, where Holmes’s 
invocation of the bad man, along with his focus on external sanctions rather 
than internal motivations, and his insistence on separating the legal and 
moral spheres, revolutionized this area of law.74  In the same speech in 
which Holmes sought to dispel the “mystic significance” attached to the 
morality-based “primary rights and duties” of contract law,75
 
 72. This is the approach I take in Part III of this Article. 
 Holmes urged 
 73. Holmes, supra note 3, at 460, 471.  Holmes articulated a similar view in another 
monumental work nearly two decades earlier. See HOLMES, supra note 47, at 115 (“Be the 
exceptions more or less numerous, the general purpose of the law of torts is to secure a man 
indemnity against certain forms of harm to person, reputation, or estate, at the hands of his 
neighbors, not because they are wrong, but because they are harms.”).  Interpreting the first 
passage, one commentator wrote, “Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated the theory that as law 
matures, liability—civil and criminal—becomes more external and less reliant on mental 
state.” Adam Candeub, Comment, Motive Crimes and Other Minds, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 
2071, 2077 (1994). 
 74. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal 
Point of View:  Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1571 (2006) 
(“Holmes, by linking a radical jurisprudential argument to a radical reconceptualization of 
tort law, changed the landscape of tort theory.”); see also DAVID ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN 
HOLMES:  HIS THEORY OF TORTS IN HISTORY 1 (1995) (“From the beginning, th[e] debate 
[governing the legitimacy of tort law] has been shaped by the ideas of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, the most illustrious jurist in American law.”); Grey, Legal Pragmatism, supra note 
27, at 832 (“[Holmes’s] formulations represented a breakthrough, the implications of which 
would not be fully absorbed for several generations.  At the outset of his career as a legal 
theorist, he planted the germ of the whole modern analysis of tort and contract in terms of 
risk allocation, later embodied in such notions as loss spreading, cost internalization, and 
efficient breach.”); Sheldon M. Novick, Holmes’s Path, Holmes’s Goal, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
1028, 1030 (1997) (“The starting point of this transformation is the central insight of The 
Common Law, an imaginative leap that changed all legal thinking afterward:  the organizing 
principle of the common law was liability, not duty.”). 
 75. Holmes, supra note 3, at 462 (“Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral 
ideas more manifest than in the law of contract.  Among other things, here again the so 
called primary rights and duties are invested with a mystic significance beyond what can be 
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us to do the same for tort law by understanding the so-called “duties” 
imposed on us from the perspective of the bad man.  According to this 
view, we ought to abandon the internal perspective that would require us to 
consult our “vaguer sanctions of conscience” in order to understand the 
“duties” we owe to one another, in both tort law and contract law, in purely 
external terms:  in both torts and contracts, the only “duty” imposed on us 
by the law is to “pay a compensatory sum” if we breach our duties toward 
our fellow citizens.76
Although, once again, Holmes’s bad man view of tort law was probably 
misunderstood,
 
77 the influence of these views (even as misunderstood) 
cannot be overemphasized.78  Holmes was not merely tinkering at the 
margins with the writ of trespass, or attempting to reform the law of 
negligence by reconceptualizing the way we view causation; rather, he was 
promulgating “the blueprint for [tort law’s] organization and 
development”79
 
assigned and explained.  The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that 
you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else.”). 
 by erecting an entire jurisprudential edifice from the 
 76. Id. at 459, 462 (analogizing contract- and tort-based “duties” by describing the 
“duty” imposed on a person who “commit[s] a contract” as one in which they are “liable to 
pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass,” and the “duty” imposed 
on a person who “commit[s] a tort,” as one in which they are also “liable to pay a 
compensatory sum”).  Elsewhere in his speech, Holmes listed “as other examples of the use 
by the law of words drawn from morals” the terms “malice, intent, and negligence,” and 
sought “to show that [these terms] mean[] something different in law from what [they] 
mean[] in morals, and also to show how the difference has been obscured by giving to 
principles which have little or nothing to do with each other the same name.” Id. at 463. 
It is remarkable to note how consistent Holmes’s views were over time.  In The Common 
Law, an equally famous work written nearly two decades before Path of the Law, Holmes 
offered the following view of torts: 
  The law of torts abounds in moral phraseology.  It has much to say of wrongs, 
of malice, fraud, intent, and negligence.  Hence it may naturally be supposed that 
the risk of a man’s conduct is thrown upon him as the result of some moral short-
coming.  But while this notion has been entertained, the extreme opposite will be 
found to have been a far more popular opinion;—I mean the notion that a man is 
answerable for all the consequences of his acts, or, in other words, that he acts at 
his peril always, and wholly irrespective of the state of his consciousness upon the 
matter. 
HOLMES, supra note 47, at 65. 
 77. See, e.g., ALSCHULER, supra note 26, at 1 (“[P]ost-Holmes visions of law are the 
product of a revolt against objective concepts of right and wrong rather than a revolt against 
formalism . . . .”).  Holmes’s actual views are discussed in Part III, infra. 
 78. See, e.g., CALNAN, supra note 33, at 5 (describing Holmes’s “influence on tort law” 
as “both enormous and undeniable”). 
 79. See, e.g., id.  Professor Calnan goes on to say about Holmes’s monumental work: 
  The impact of The Common Law was profound and immediate.  In an 1881 
review, noted English legal historian Frederick Pollock remarked that “Mr. 
Holmes’ book will be a most valuable—we should say almost an indispensable—
companion to the scientific study of legal history.”  Frederic Maitland, another 
giant of English legal history, gushed that The Common Law [“]for a long time to 
come will leave its mark wide and deep on all the best thoughts of Americans and 
Englishmen about the history of their common law.” 
Id. (quoting Frederic Maitland, The Materials for English Legal History, in 2 COLLECTED 
PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 8 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911); G. EDWARD WHITE, 
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES:  LAW AND THE INNER SELF 189 (1993)). 
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ground up where “there simply was no law of torts.”80  And the blueprint 
Holmes used to build this monumental intellectual cathedral could best be 
appreciated, according to Holmes, by looking at it through the eyes of the 
bad man.81
But what is at stake, exactly, in adopting the bad man’s perspective with 
regard to tort law?  Once again, it may be helpful to contrast the bad man 
perspective with its counterpart, the “good man.”  According to this 
perspective, a good man understands the notion of obligation not in terms of 
an external penalty a court may impose whenever he engages in a 
dangerous activity or fails to take the proper level of care, but in terms of 
internal norms governing the rights and duties that members of civil society 
owe each other.
 
82  Accordingly, courts adopting such a view do not impose 
liability on an actor simply because the danger of his activities are 
“manifest to a greater or less degree,”83
Conforming one’s behavior to the internal standards of morality has other 
benefits as well.  If, following Aristotle, we hold that “[m]oral goodness . . . 
is the result of habit,”
 but because the actor has acted 
wrongly in that he has violated the rights of another.  Viewed in such a way, 
the morally laden language of tort law is not something to be ignored or 
explained away, but can be pointed to as evidence supporting the idea that 
what the law really requires is for one party to conform his behavior to 
commonly accepted notions of morality, and not to simply choose between 
performing one’s duty or paying a sanction. 
84 and that “it is from the repeated performance of just 
and temperate acts that we acquire virtues,”85 then a good man view of law 
that requires individuals to internalize the law’s norms would, with 
continual practice, help individuals become more virtuous citizens 
themselves.86
 
 80. See, e.g., id. at 4; see also 1 EDWIN A. JAGGARD, HAND-BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 
at vi (1895) (“The theory of Torts was essentially terra incognita until the contributions of 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., appeared on the subject.”). 
  Allowing citizens to behave as Holmes’s bad man, on the 
other hand, would not only fail to carry out the Aristotelian idea, but would 
 81. CALNAN, supra note 33, at 8 (“Holmes believed that law is not a principle of justice, 
but merely ‘[t]he prophe[cies] of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more 
pretentious.’  In other words, the law is a material sanction that will motivate a ‘bad man’ to 
refrain from bad acts, not an ethical rule which depends for its enforcement on ‘vaguer 
sanctions of conscience.’” (quoting Holmes, supra note 3, at 460–61)). 
 82. See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE:  IN DEFENCE OF A 
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY (2003); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE 
LAW (1995). 
 83. Holmes, supra note 3, at 471. 
 84. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. II, at 31 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin 
Books 2004) (c. 384 B.C.E.). 
 85. Id. at 37–38. 
 86. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 40, bk. III, ch. ix, at 82 (“[W]hosoever endeavours 
to establish wholesome laws in a state, attends to the virtues and the vices of each individual 
who composes it; from whence it is evident, that the first care of him who would found a city 
. . . must be to have his citizens virtuous; for otherwise it is merely an alliance for self-
defence; differing from those of the same cast which are made between different people only 
in place:  for law is an agreement and a pledge . . . between the citizens of their intending to 
do justice to each other.”). 
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make a mockery of the law itself by allowing individuals to inflict harm on 
others whenever they could pay the legal cost of doing so. 
Holmes, however, seemed to explicitly reject this internal point of view.  
In a famous series of lectures given nearly two decades before The Path of 
the Law, Holmes acknowledged the morally laden language of tort law but 
seemed to reject the notion that it was there “for the purpose of improving 
men’s hearts.”87
The true explanation of the reference of liability to a moral standard . . . is 
to give a man a fair chance to avoid doing the harm before he is held 
responsible for it.  It is intended to reconcile the policy of letting accidents 
lie where they fall, and the reasonable freedom of others with the 
protection of the individual from injury.
  Rather: 
88
Holmes’s bad man perspective has had a tremendous impact on tort law 
in this country
 
89
When is conduct negligent?  According to the famous test set forth by 
Baron Edward Hall Alderson
 and has radically changed the way we view even the most 
basic of torts.  Consider, for example, the tort of negligence with its reliance 
on the “reasonable man” standard as that standard was understood before 
Holmes. 
90 in the 1856 case of Blyth v. Birmingham 
Waterworks Co.,91
 
 87. HOLMES, supra note 
 which not only established the “reasonable man” 
47, at 115. 
 88. Id.  Holmes recognized that his theory cut against the grain.  In The Path of the Law, 
Holmes reports a recent conversation he had with a famous English judge to whom he had 
conveyed his views:  “[W]hen I stated my view to a very eminent English judge the other 
day, he said:  ‘You are discussing what the law ought to be; as the law is, you must show a 
right.  A man is not liable for negligence unless he is subject to a duty.’” Holmes, supra note 
3, at 471–72.  Although Holmes thought that the English judge’s view was decidedly 
“wrong,” he acknowledged that “it is familiar, and I dare say generally is accepted in 
England.” Id. at 472. 
 89. ROSENBERG, supra note 74, at 1 (“From the beginning, th[e] debate [governing the 
legitimacy of tort law] has been shaped by the ideas of Oliver Wendell Holmes, the most 
illustrious jurist in American law.”); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 74, at 1571 (“Holmes, 
by linking a radical jurisprudential argument to a radical reconceptualization of tort law, 
changed the landscape of tort theory.”); Grey, Legal Pragmatism, supra note 27, at 832 
(“[Holmes’s] formulations represented a breakthrough, the implications of which would not 
be fully absorbed for several generations.  At the outset of his career as a legal theorist, he 
planted the germ of the whole modern analysis of tort and contract in terms of risk 
allocation, later embodied in such notions as loss spreading, cost internalization, and 
efficient breach.”); Novick, supra note 74, at 1030 (“The starting point of this transformation 
is the central insight of The Common Law, an imaginative leap that changed all legal 
thinking afterward:  the organizing principle of the common law was liability, not duty.”). 
 90. Baron Alderson has another claim to fame as well:  he was the judge who 
established the basic rule, familiar to every Contracts student in the Anglo-American legal 
world, that consequential damages, to be recoverable, must be foreseeable by the promisor at 
the time of entering into a contract. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex.) 
151; 9 Ex. 341, 354 (“Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has 
broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of 
contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, 
i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as 
may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time 
they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.”). 
 91. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (Ex.); 11 Ex. 781. 
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standard,92 but serves as the basis for pattern jury instructions to this day.93 
negligence is defined as “the omission to do something which a reasonable 
man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the 
conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent 
and reasonable man would not do.”94  Such a standard, it seems, would not 
be very hospitable to Holmes’s bad man, who could no longer rely on an 
external cost-benefit analysis to guide his behavior, but must presumably 
adopt the internal perspective of other “reasonable men” of his community, 
who will no doubt be guided by their own “vaguer sanctions of 
conscience,”95
The bad man’s prospects take on a decidedly different flavor, however, 
and fare much better in the hands of law and economics scholars, who have 
done for Holmes’s theory of tort law (through the Learned Hand Formula) 
what other scholars have done for his theory of contract law (through 
efficient breach theory).  In fact, perhaps nowhere is Holmes’s bad man 
theory of law more perfectly encapsulated than in the famous Learned Hand 
Formula,
 if he is to avoid acting negligently. 
96 which remains the starting point for the economic analysis of 
negligence to this day.97  First formally articulated in United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co.,98
 
 92. Margo Schlanger, Gender Matters:  Teaching a Reasonable Woman Standard in 
Personal Injury Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 769, 769 n.2 (2001). 
 Judge Learned Hand also rejected the “reasonable 
 93. See Richard W. Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J. 
JURIS. 143, 144 n.2 (2002). 
 94. Blyth, 156 Eng. Rep. at 1049. 
 95. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459. 
 96. See Patrick J. Kelley, The Carroll Towing Company Case and the Teaching of Tort 
Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 731, 742–48 (2001) (arguing that the Hand Formula was 
influenced by the definition of negligence adopted by the Restatement (First) of Torts, which 
can itself be traced to the seminal article by Henry Taylor Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. 
REV. 40 (1915), who was in turn influenced by the theory of negligence articulated by Oliver 
Wendell Holmes in his famous book, The Common Law).  Incidentally, Holmes himself was 
likely influenced by Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill. Id. at 748. 
 97. COLEMAN, supra note 82, at 14 (“[E]conomic analysis explicates negligence in terms 
of the Learned Hand formula . . . .  Negligence is the imposition of unreasonable risks, and 
the criteria for the proper application of the concept of a reasonable risk are given by the 
Learned Hand test.  The Learned Hand test is itself simply an expression of the economic 
goal of tort law, namely, the optimal reduction of accident costs.”); Samuel J. Levine, 
Richard Posner Meets Reb Chaim of Brisk:  A Comparative Study in the Founding of 
Intellectual Legal Movements, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 95, 108 (2006) (stating that the Hand 
Formula served as the “basis for the economic analysis of negligence” since the case was 
first decided in 1947); Daniel Q. Posin, The Error of the Coase Theorem:  Of Judges Hand 
and Posner and Carroll Towing, 74 TUL. L. REV. 629, 644 & n.48 (1999) (“In effect, the 
Posner-Hand analysis uses the Coase Theorem” which is “‘basic to the whole economic 
analysis of law’” (quoting The Fire of Truth:  A Remembrance of Law and Economics at 
Chicago, 1932–1970, supra note 45, at 226 (statement of Richard Posner))); Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 2001 (2007) (“Professor Posner 
used the case to energize his entire economic theory of tort law, which, in my view, remains 
the most celebrated within the legal academy.”). 
 98. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 9, 85–86 (1987) (stating that although 
“most lawyers and law professors still believe . . . that the actual as well as the ideal function 
of tort law is to achieve fairness rather than efficiency,” in fact “something like the Hand 
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man” standard that seemed to require a potential wrongdoer to view the law 
of negligence from the good man’s internal point of view,99
[An] owner’s duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against 
resulting injuries is a function of three variables:  (1) The probability [of 
harm]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury [if the harm comes about]; 
[and] (3) the burden of adequate precautions.  Possibly it serves to bring 
this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms:  if the probability be 
called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether 
B is less than L multiplied by P:  i.e., whether B < PL.
 and provided 
the following external standard by which courts should determine whether 
or not a defendant had acted negligently: 
100
 
formula has long been used to decide negligence cases,” and “Hand was purporting only to 
make explicit what had long been the implicit meaning of negligence”). 
 
 99. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 96, at 749–50 (stating that just as “[t]he critical question 
for Holmes . . . was not simple foreseeability by the ordinary reasonable man, but the 
specific laws of antecedence and consequence that enable us to foresee harm from certain 
conduct under certain circumstances,” so too for Judge Hand, who, as a “friend and admirer 
of Holmes,” “refus[ed] to include foreseeability in his simplified reformulation of the 
unreasonable foreseeable risk test”).  The result was a test that was “more scientific:  you do 
not need to use that weaselly creature, the ordinary reasonable man, with his penchant for 
sentiment and outmoded custom, who may upset the purely objective calculation of costs 
and benefits.” Id. But see Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence:  Hand Formula 
Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 817 
(2001) (noting that, although the reasonable person test and the Hand Formula can be 
thought of “as independent and alternative techniques for determining negligence,” the two 
can also be combined “by characterizing the Hand Formula as the test a reasonable person 
would use in deciding which precautions to take to avoid accident risks to others”). 
 100. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173 (Hand, J.).  As pointed out by Professor Kelley, 
“Judge Hand had expressed this same understanding of the appropriate test of negligence, 
without the algebraic notation, over six years before in Conway v. O’Brien.” Kelley, supra 
note 96, at 743 (citing Conway v. O’Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) (Hand, J.) 
(“The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of three factors:  
the likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it 
happens, and balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.”)); see 
id. at 754 (“Judge Posner recognized the Carroll Towing Co. negligence formula as ‘a 
valuable aid to clear thinking about the factors that are relevant to a judgment of negligence 
and about the relationship among those factors’ even though ‘the formula does not yield 
mathematically precise results in practice, [since the burden of precautions, the probability 
and potential gravity of harm have never all been quantified] in an actual lawsuit.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 
683 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.))); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 29, 32–33 (1972) (“Hand was adumbrating, perhaps unwittingly, an economic 
meaning of negligence.  Discounting (multiplying) the cost of an accident if it occurs by the 
probability of occurrence yields a measure of the economic benefit to be anticipated from 
incurring the costs necessary to prevent the accident.  The cost of prevention is what Hand 
meant by the burden of taking precautions against the accident . . . .  If the cost of safety 
measures or of curtailment—whichever cost is lower—exceeds the benefit in accident 
avoidance to be gained by incurring that cost, society would be better off, in economic terms, 
to forgo accident prevention.  A rule making the enterprise liable for the accidents that occur 
in such cases cannot be justified on the ground that it will induce the enterprise to increase 
the safety of its operations.  When the cost of accidents is less than the cost of prevention, a 
rational profit-maximizing enterprise will pay tort judgments to the accident victims rather 
than incur the larger cost of avoiding liability.”). 
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Under this approach, codified in our law101 and reflected in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts,102 a court need “merely calculate[] the costs 
and the benefits of an activity to decide whether an injurer [is] 
negligent,”103 and need not be concerned with determining what a 
virtuous104 or reasonable105
 
 101. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1013, 1037–38 (1991) (“[T]he process of balancing the magnitude of the risk against the cost 
of risk prevention has been embedded in negligence law since the nineteenth century, and 
was rendered official by the First Restatement of Torts and Learned Hand’s opinion in 
United States v. Carroll Towing Co.”). But see Gilles, supra note 
 person in the defendant’s position would have 
99, at 861 (arguing that 
although the Restatement (Third) has explicitly adopted the Hand Formula, the cost-benefit 
of risk-utility balancing has been an implicit aspect of the reasonable person standard for 
seventy years); Kelley, supra note 96, at 752–53 (“Stephen Gilles has confirmed what this 
author had earlier suggested:  judges ordinarily instruct juries on the negligence issue to 
determine whether the actor behaved as a ‘reasonably prudent person’ or an ‘ordinary 
reasonable person.’  Judges do not ordinarily instruct juries on the negligence issue to 
balance the costs and benefits of greater care.” (citing Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand 
Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1016 (1994))); Kenneth W. Simons, Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, and Tradeoffs:  A Closer Look at the Controversy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171, 
1183 (2008) (“To be sure, there is much controversy about the descriptive claim that the 
Hand test reflects Anglo-American tort law.  Jury instructions (except in some products 
liability cases) rarely refer to Hand balancing, and appellate decisions refer to such balancing 
only intermittently.  Rather, ‘reasonable care under the circumstances’ appears to be the 
(remarkably vague and opaque) ‘standard’ that many jurisdictions require juries to apply in 
determining negligence.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 
(2005) (“A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all 
the circumstances.  Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person’s conduct 
lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in 
harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to 
eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.”).  It may have been the case, however, that Judge 
Learned Hand was himself influenced by the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Restatement 
project, rather than the other way around. See Kelley, supra note 96, at 743–44 (“Where, 
then, did Judge Hand get his formula?  We know from his biographers that Learned Hand 
was an intellectually ambitious and progressive judge, alive to the latest currents of thought 
in the legal community.  This found expression in many ways, including Judge Hand’s early 
membership in the ALI  and his vigorous support for its project of restating the common law.  
This suggests that a likely source for Hand’s description of the negligence standard would be 
the Restatement of the Division of the Law Relating to Negligence, approved by the ALI at 
its annual meeting in 1934.  Sure enough, when we turn to that Restatement we find 
negligence explained as conduct posing an unreasonable foreseeable risk of harm to another.  
The Restatement defined an unreasonable risk as ‘one of such magnitude as to outweigh 
what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.’  
The Restatement went on to list factors to be considered in determining the utility of the 
actor’s conduct, as well as factors considered in determining the magnitude of the risk.” 
(quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS:  NEGLIGENCE § 291 (1934)) (citing GERALD GUNTHER, 
LEARNED HAND:  THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 190–415 (1994))); see also Randy Lee, A Look at 
God, Feminism, and Tort Law, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 369, 387 (1992) (“The Restatement 
approach differs from the Hand test only in that it measures the burden and loss, factors in 
terms of social burden and loss rather than in terms of the burden and loss to the parties.” 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291–93 (1977))). 
 103. Frank J. Vandall, Judge Posner’s Negligence-Efficiency Theory:  A Critique, 35 
EMORY L.J. 383, 383 (1986). 
 104. Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence:  A 
Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 592 (2002) (citing Heidi Li 
Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence:  Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1431 (2000)). 
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foreseen, or whether a tortfeasor’s actions were intrinsically right or 
wrong.106  Rather, under this modern-day iteration of the “bad man” theory 
of negligence, a court need only determine which party is the “cheapest cost 
avoider”107 (i.e., “the actor who could most easily discover and 
inexpensively remediate the hazard”),108 and then place the cost of accident 
prevention on this person to encourage them to take only those precautions 
that are economically feasible.109
If we recall Holmes’s definition of the bad man as one “who cares only 
for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to 
predict,”
 
110 one can immediately see how useful such a theory would be to 
him.  When followed,111
 
 105. Id. at 591 (citing HOLMES, supra note 
 such a theory allows the bad man to predict, with a 
fair degree of accuracy, how a court would rule, and thereby provides him 
with external guidance (via the threat of possible sanctions) regarding the 
appropriate precautions to take. 
47, at 87–88). But see RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 169 (6th ed. 2003) (characterizing Blyth v. Birmingham 
Waterworks Co. as a case illustrating Baron Alderson’s economic understanding of the law 
of negligence, and remarking that although the injury was “of unprecedented severity,” the 
court did not find negligence because “[t]he damage was not so great as to make the 
expected cost of the accident greater than the cost of prevention” because “the probability of 
the loss had been low”). 
 106. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 104, at 591–92 (citing Catharine Wells, Tort Law as 
Corrective Justice:  A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 
2402–13 (1990)). 
 107. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096–97, 1119 (1972). 
 108. M. Stuart Madden, Selected Federal Tort Reform and Restatement Proposals 
Through the Lenses of Corrective Justice and Efficiency, 32 GA. L. REV. 1017, 1047 (1998). 
 109. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 99, at 818 (“The Hand Norm tells us that it is negligent 
to omit a precaution if the reduction in expected accident costs would have been greater than 
the costs of the precaution,” or, stated algebraically, “it is negligent to omit a precaution if 
PL > B”); Kelley & Wendt, supra note 104, at 591 (“[A]dvocates of the Carroll Towing Co. 
test have suggested that the ordinary reasonable person standard asks a cost-benefit question:  
whether the burden of taking precautions against a foreseeable risk is less than the 
foreseeable probability times the foreseeable gravity of threatened harm to others if the 
precautions are not taken.”). 
 110. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459; see also id. at 457 (“The object of our study, then, is 
prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of 
the courts.”). 
 111. Compare LANDES & POSNER, supra note 98, at 9, 85–86 (stating that although “most 
lawyers and law professors still believe . . . that the actual as well as the ideal function of tort 
law is to achieve fairness rather than efficiency,” in fact “something like the Hand formula 
has long been used to decide negligence cases,” and “Hand was purporting only to make 
explicit what had long been the implicit meaning of negligence”), and Robert L. Rabin, Law 
for Law’s Sake, 105 YALE L.J. 2261, 2275 (1996) (“Long before Carroll Towing was 
decided, common law judges were speaking the prose version of the Learned Hand formula 
without knowing it . . . .”), with Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the 
“Hand” Formula, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 145, 273 (2003) (“If one turns from the 
academic discussions of negligence law to the actual cases, it immediately becomes clear 
that the aggregate-risk-utility test of negligence that is set forth in Learned Hand’s formula, 
in the various editions of the Restatement, and in Richard Posner’s academic writings is 
almost never referred to in jury instructions, is seldom referred to in judicial opinions, and is 
inconsistent with the actual criteria applied by the courts in various types of situations.”). 
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And what sorts of precautions will a bad man likely take under such a 
theory?  Like our bad man of contract law, who will breach his contract 
wherever it is profitable to do so, the bad man of tort law will also breach 
his tort-based “duty” whenever it is profitable to do so. 
Consider, for example, the following facts.  The CEO of a large auto 
manufacturer wishes to offer an affordable subcompact car, and is presented 
with one of two choices by his design engineers.  If the CEO selects choice 
number one, then a fuel tank will be placed above the rear axle of the car, 
which will increase the car’s safety by allowing additional crunch space in 
the event of a rear-end collision (which customers will appreciate) while 
reducing the available trunk space (which customers will not appreciate) 
and decreasing overall sales (which the company will not appreciate).  If, on 
the other hand, the CEO selects choice number two, then the fuel tank will 
be placed behind the rear axle of the car, thereby reducing the car’s safety 
by reducing the available crunch space in the event of a rear-end collision 
and causing the gas tank to explode (which will cause some individuals to 
suffer agonizing burn deaths and burn injuries), but increase the trunk space 
(which those who survive will appreciate) and increase overall sales (which 
the company will appreciate).  How should the company make its decision?  
What advice would you, as the lawyer, give to a company in this position? 
If the CEO (or his lawyer) behaves like the bad man, he will not choose 
his course of conduct based on his internal “vaguer sanctions of 
conscience,” but by recourse to an external cost-benefit analysis.  If the total 
revenue generated by pursuing option number two exceeds the total revenue 
generated by option number one by a large enough margin to pay for the 
increased cost of accidents generated by option number one, then option 
number two will be pursued, but not otherwise.  The human lives at risk are 
only important to the extent that their loss in an accident must be paid for 
by the company. 
Let us add one further wrinkle to this hypothetical.  The CEO has 
decided to pursue option number two for the reasons just discussed, but 
before the cars are manufactured, he is again approached by his design 
engineers and told that about 180 individuals are expected to suffer 
agonizing burn deaths from the exploding gas tanks, and another 180 are 
expected to undergo serious burn injuries, but that all of these deaths and 
injuries can be prevented by reinforcing the automobiles at a cost of a few 
extra dollars per automobile.  In this case, how is a CEO employing 
Holmes’s bad man calculus expected to behave? 
First, he will put before him Learned Hand’s formula, B < PL, and will 
start plugging in numbers.  Suppose he predicts112
 
 112. Recall that the “bad man,” by definition, “cares only for the material consequences 
which such knowledge enables him to predict.” Holmes, supra note 
 that each death will cost 
the company $200,000, and each burn injury will cost the company 
$67,000.  He also knows that about 180 individuals are expected to suffer 
each type of injury.  Multiplying 180 by $267,000, he calculates that the 
total cost to the company of the deaths and injuries that will be caused if the 
3, at 459. 
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repairs are not undertaken will be roughly $50 million.  He has now 
calculated PL, but still needs a figure for B.  To get this figure, the CEO 
will not be too interested in the few extra dollars it might cost per car to 
undertake the repairs, but will be very interested in knowing how much it 
will cost to repair each car in the entire fleet.  Suppose he is told that the 
cost of such repairs is around $137 million.  Plugging this number into B, 
he now recognizes that B > PL, and the company can avoid being found 
negligent if it invests $137 million to reduce $50 million of harm.  But he 
also recognizes something else.  If he does not require the company to 
undertake any repairs whatsoever, then B will be less than PL, and, per the 
Learned Hand formula, a court will find the company negligent.  This 
seems bad at first, but upon further reflection, is not so bad after all.  This is 
because the CEO also predicts that the damages it will be required to pay by 
a court in the event of being found negligent will only be PL, or $50 
million, which would be lower than the cost of the repairs, or $137 million, 
for an $87 million “savings.”  Needless to say, the CEO adopting the bad 
man approach will not elect to have the repairs made.113
As you have probably guessed, the “hypothetical” above was more than 
loosely based on the facts of a real case, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor 
Company.
 
114  The car was a Pinto, the company was Ford, and the public 
was furious.115  Acknowledging, in some vague sense, that cost-benefit 
takes place in boardrooms across corporate America is one thing.  Allowing 
a company to gamble with human lives is another thing entirely.  It was in 
large part for this reason that the jury required Ford to pay an additional 
$125 million in punitive damages,116 and why Holmes’s views (if these in 
fact be his true views)117
In fact, when the rubber of facts meets the road of Holmes’s theory upon 
which the Pintos of the world drive, the logical implications of accepting 
(let alone indulging) the bad men of the world seem unpalatable.  With the 
availability of punitive damages, it seems, the bad man need not be 
 are not infrequently met with hostility among 
scholars, judges, and the public alike. 
 
 113. Barbara Ann White, Risk-Utility Analysis and the Learned Hand Formula:  A Hand 
that Helps or a Hand that Hides?, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 77, 131 n.279 (1990) (“In making its 
cost-benefit analysis, Ford used the figures calculated by the National Highway Traffic and 
Safety Association to be the value of human life ($200,000) and serious burn injury 
($67,000).  Using an estimation of 180 burn deaths and 180 serious burn injuries per year, 
Ford calculated that the benefits that would be realized by adding safety devices to the 
Pinto’s fuel tank, in terms of lives saved and injuries prevented, would equal approximately 
$50 million dollars, whereas the associated costs would be $137 million dollars.” (citing S. 
Kinghorn, Corporate Harm—A Structural Analysis of the Criminogenic Elements of the 
Corporation 218 (1984) (unpublished dissertation))). 
 114. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (“There was evidence that Ford could 
have corrected the hazardous design defects at minimal cost but decided to defer correction 
of the shortcomings by engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives and limbs 
against corporate profits.”). 
 115. See generally Schwartz, supra note 101, at 1041–43; White, supra note 113. 
 116. Although the amount was later reduced to $3.5 million by the trial judge. See 
Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358. 
 117. In Part III, I return to these facts to work out a more logical and palatable implication 
of Holmes’s theory than has so far been represented here. 
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indulged by the good people of this world.  Yet, if punitive damages were 
ever abolished or seriously limited, on the one hand, and the bad man were 
allowed to continue running rampant over the legal landscape, on the other, 
then indulge him we must, even if doing so would tend to produce the sort 
of results seen in Grimshaw.  Shockingly, this seems to have been the latest 
move made by our courts, and it has happened in no less than the highest 
court in the land.  It is this most recent move that we turn to in the next 
section. 
C.  The Bad Man’s Theory of Punitive Damages:  From Punishment and 
Deterrence to Predictability and Efficiency 
[A] penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity, so that even 
Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’ can look ahead with some ability to know 
what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another. 
 — Justice David Souter, U.S. Supreme Court118
 
 
Even in the uncertain world of punitive damages, one thing has always 
been certain:  this area of law has always been beyond the bad man’s reach.  
This is because, since the first common law punitive damages cases were 
decided more than two centuries ago,119 courts have maintained120
 
 118. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2627 (2008) (Souter, J.) (citing 
Holmes, supra note 
—and 
3, at 459). 
 119. Common law courts first recognized punitive damages in 1763 in Wilkes v. Wood, 
(1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P.); Lofft, 1 and Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768 
(K.B.); 2 Wils K.B. 205.  A few decades later, the concept began to make its way into the 
common law of the United States in the cases of Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6, 7 
(1784) and Coryell v. Colbough, 1 N.J.L. (Coxe) 77 (1791).  In Coryell, the judge instructed 
the jury to award damages “for example’s sake, to prevent such offences in [the] future.” 
Coryell, 1 N.J.L. (Coxe) at 77.  The concept was subsequently acknowledged by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 362, 370 (1851), where the court 
held that “the jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages 
upon a defendant” in certain instances, including “actions of trespass and all actions on the 
case for torts.” Id. 
The concept of punitive damages, of course, stretches back thousands of years and can be 
found in sources as diverse as the Mosaic Law, see Exodus 22:9 (King James) (“For all 
manner of trespass, whether it be for ox, for ass, for sheep, for raiment, or for any manner of 
lost thing, which another challengeth to be his, the cause of both parties shall come before 
the judges; and whom the judges shall condemn, he shall pay double unto his neighbor.”); 
the Code of Hammurabi, see THE CODE OF HAMMURABI ¶ 265, at 48 (L.W. King trans., 
NuVision Publications 2007) (c. 1780 B.C.E.) (“If a herdsman, to whose care cattle or sheep 
have been entrusted, be guilty of fraud and make false returns of the natural increase, or sell 
them for money, then shall he be convicted and pay the owner ten times the loss.”); the 
Hittite Law and the Code of Manu, see James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive 
Damages:  A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1984); the 
Twelve Tables of the Romans, RUSS VERSTEEG, LAW IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 345 (2002) 
(noting that under the Twelve Tables, a “thief was required to pay quadruple damages (i.e., 
four-times the value of the objects that he had attempted to steal)”); Greek Law, see 1 
ROBERT J. BONNER & GERTRUDE SMITH, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FROM HOMER TO 
ARISTOTLE 78 (1938) (“The penalty [for assaulting a slave girl] was double the amount of 
the injury.”); and even Egyptian Ptolemaic Law, see VERSTEEG, supra, at 165 (“As a rule, a 
convicted thief had to return stolen goods to the individual to whom they belonged, and, in 
addition, pay damages to the victim of double or triple (the cases vary) the value of the 
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continue to maintain121
This makes the bad man’s recent appearance and use in the landmark 
decision of Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
—that punitive damages exist to punish and deter 
present and future wrongdoers.  Such twin goals, it would seem, speak 
directly to the bad man who would engage in nefarious but profitable 
conduct, for he must now be worried not only about the price he must pay 
for his conduct in terms of compensatory damages, but the additional 
punitive damages a court may impose to punish him and deter others from 
engaging in such conduct.  Punitive damages, in other words, were 
traditionally reserved for those who intentionally engaged in prohibited 
conduct whenever the price was right to do so (i.e., the bad man). 
122
 
stolen goods (what modern law might call ‘punitive damages’).”); see also id. at 185 (“[A] 
thief had to return the stolen goods and pay double or triple their value, as a kind of punitive 
damages.”).  
 a case decided by the highest 
court in our land, all the more shocking.  In Exxon, the Supreme Court has 
seemingly made a radical departure from the principles that have governed 
punitive damages for the last several hundred years by making the twin 
pillars of punitive damages jurisprudence (punishment and deterrence) 
 120. See, e.g., Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498–99 (“Damages are designed not only as a 
satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from 
any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action 
itself.”). 
 121. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2621 (“Regardless of the alternative rationales over the years, 
the consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at 
retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 
351 (2007) (“‘Punitive damages are awarded against a defendant to punish misconduct and 
to deter misconduct,’ and ‘are not intended to compensate the plaintiff or anyone else for 
damages caused by the defendant’s conduct.’” (quoting Joint Appendix at 283a, Philip 
Morris USA, 549 U.S. 346 (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL 2147483)); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (“[C]ompensatory and punitive damages, 
although usually awarded at the same time by the same decisionmaker, serve different 
purposes.  Compensatory damages ‘are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff 
has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.’  By contrast, punitive damages 
serve a broader function; they are aimed at deterrence and retribution.” (citations omitted) 
(quoting Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001))); Cooper 
Indus., 532 U.S. at 432 (“Although compensatory damages and punitive damages are 
typically awarded at the same time by the same decisionmaker, they serve distinct purposes.  
The former are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason 
of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.  The latter . . . operate as ‘private fines’ intended to 
punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing.” (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 903 (1979))); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (“Punitive damages 
may properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful 
conduct and deterring its repetition.”); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19 (“[P]unitive damages are 
imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence.”); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 
Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266–67 (1981) (“Punitive damages by definition are not intended to 
compensate the injured party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful action was 
intentional or malicious, and to deter him and others from similar extreme conduct.”); Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (“[Punitive damages] are not compensation 
for injury.  Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible 
conduct and to deter its future occurrence.”). 
 122. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (finding that punitive damages should not be so high as to 
prevent an agent—like the bad man himself—from being able to predict the cost of violating 
the law). 
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harder to implement than ever before.  As we shall soon see, not only has 
the “bad man” been given free reign by the Supreme Court to ride 
roughshod over the rights of others, but the Court has also taken the 
remarkable and unprecedented step of announcing that the law, far from 
being sacrosanct, may be broken by those who are willing and able to pay a 
pre-specified price.123
On March 23, 1989, Captain Joseph Hazelwood, a relapsed alcoholic 
with a heightened tolerance for drink,
 
124 consumed an amount of alcohol 
that would have made most non-alcoholics pass out125 before attempting to 
navigate the 900-foot long supertanker Exxon Valdez through the 
dangerous, icy waters along the Prince William Sound.  As it approached 
midnight, Captain Hazelwood, realizing that the icy waters were in a worse 
condition than usual, radioed the Coast Guard and asked for permission to 
navigate the supertanker across “a less icy path” taken by the previous 
outbound ship.126  The Coast Guard approved the request, which traded one 
danger for another by allowing Captain Hazelwood to avoid the icy waters 
only by steering the supertanker around the dangerous Bligh Reef near the 
Alaskan coast.  Unfathomably, just two minutes before Captain Hazelwood 
was required to make a turn around the reef, he inexplicably “put the tanker 
on autopilot, speeding it up, making the turn trickier, and any mistake 
harder to correct”127 in order to retire to his cabin “to do paperwork.”128
 
 123. Even more importantly, the Supreme Court’s reasoning has already found its way 
into our lower courts, where the Court’s initial misunderstanding of Holmes’s bad man, if 
not checked, threatens to do particular damage. See, e.g., Bridgeport Harbor Place I, LLC v. 
Ganim, No. X06CV040184523S, 2008 WL 4926925, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 
2008) (“As cogently expressed by the Supreme Court, ‘[a] penalty should be reasonably 
predictable in its severity, so that even Justice Holmes’ “bad man” can look ahead with some 
ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another . . . .  And 
when the bad man’s counterparts turn up from time to time, the penalty scheme they face 
ought to threaten them with a fair probability of suffering in like degree when they wreak 
like damage . . . .  The common sense of justice would surely bar penalties that reasonable 
people would think excessive for the harm caused in the circumstances.’” (citing Exxon, 128 
S. Ct. at 2610)). 
  In 
Although the metaphor of the bad man was not previously unknown to judges deciding 
punitive damages cases, as illustrated in Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454 
(Miss. 1983) (finding a Mississippi Chancery court is allowed to grant punitive damages 
because the “bad man” could foresee the possibility of paying such damages) and Luban, 
supra note 1 (discussing Holmes’s prediction theory, morality in the law, and the 
relationship between punitive damages and the bad man), the Supreme Court’s recent 
endorsement of the bad man approach to law is unprecedented, and illustrates how 
dangerous a misunderstood idea may become. 
 124. Indeed, Captain Hazelwood had recently “completed a 28-day alcohol treatment 
program while employed by Exxon, as his superiors knew, but dropped out of a prescribed 
follow-up program and stopped going to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.” Exxon, 128 S. 
Ct. at 2612.  In fact, as the Supreme Court noted, drinking was nothing new to captain 
Hazelwood, who could be found drinking “in bars, parking lots, apartments, airports, 
airplanes, restaurants, hotels, at various ports, and aboard Exxon tankers.” Id. 
 125. Captain Hazelwood had “downed at least five double vodkas in the waterfront bars 
of Valdez, an intake of about 15 ounces of 80-proof alcohol, enough ‘that a non-alcoholic 
would have passed out.’” Id. (quoting In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1236 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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his stead, Captain Hazelwood placed Joseph Cousins, an unlicensed pilot, 
and helmsman Robert Kagan, a non-officer, in charge of navigating the 
supertanker around the Bligh Reef.129  Unfortunately, Cousins and Kagan 
failed to make the required turn, and the supertanker slammed into the reef, 
tearing open the hull of the ship from which oil began to spill.  At this 
point, Captain Hazelwood rushed up from his cabin, where he “tried but 
failed to rock the Valdez off the reef, a maneuver which could have spilled 
more oil and caused the ship to founder.”130  All in all, about eleven million 
gallons of crude oil were spilled into the Price William Sound.131  As for 
Captain Hazelwood, it was estimated that his blood-alcohol level was about 
.241, or “three times the legal limit for driving in most States,” at the time 
of the oil spill.132
After finding that both Exxon and Hazelwood were reckless, the jury 
awarded $287 million in compensatory damages and assessed additional 
punitive damages in the amount of $5 billion against Exxon and $5000 
against Hazelwood.
 
133  The Ninth Circuit remitted the amount of punitives 
to $2.5 billion, and the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, in part, to 
determine whether the punitive damages were excessive.134
After briefly tracing the history of punitive damages in England and 
America, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the twin goals of 
“retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”
 
135  It noted, however, that 
“American punitive damages have been the target of audible criticism in 
recent decades,”136 and that much of this criticism revolves around “the 
stark unpredictability of punitive awards.”137
 
 128. Id. 
  To reign in this “stark 
unpredictability,” the Supreme Court invoked the help of Holmes’s bad 
man, and held that:  “[A] penalty should be reasonably predictable in its 
severity, so that even Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’ can look ahead with some 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 2613. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 2614. 
 134. Id.  Although the case was decided under principles of maritime common law, a 
recent search on Westlaw indicates that the case has already begun exerting influence over 
punitive damages cases in general.  
 135. Id. at 2621. 
 136. Id. at 2624. 
 137. Id. at 2625.  Interestingly, the Court came to its realization that punitive damages are 
starkly unpredictable only several paragraphs after noting that 
[a] survey of the literature reveals that discretion to award punitive damages has 
not mass-produced runaway awards, and although some studies show the dollar 
amounts of punitive-damages awards growing over time, even in real terms, by 
most accounts the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards has remained 
less than 1:1.  Nor do the data substantiate a marked increase in the percentage of 
cases with punitive awards over the past several decades.  The figures thus show 
an overall restraint and suggest that in many instances a high ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages is substantially greater than necessary to punish or deter. 
Id. at 2624–25 (footnotes omitted). 
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ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or 
another.”138
The Supreme Court went on to state that: 
 
Accordingly, given the need to protect against the possibility (and the 
disruptive cost to the legal system) of awards that are unpredictable and 
unnecessary, either for deterrence or for measured retribution, we 
consider that a 1:1 ratio, which is above the median award, is a fair upper 
limit in such maritime cases.139
Here, then, is the first example ever of the highest court in our land not 
only acknowledging, but endorsing, Holmes’s bad man, by helping him do 
what he could never do before:  calculate with certainty the cost of breaking 
the law.  Recall that, in Grimshaw,
 
140 the Ford Motor Company behaved as 
one would generally predict Holmes’s bad man to behave,141 but Ford 
found its calculations less than reliable in significant part due to the jury’s 
imposition of punitive damages.  But now, with a 1:1 ratio representing the 
upper limit of punitive to compensatory damages, a bad man can choose 
with impunity among any number of nefarious activities so long as he is 
rich enough to pay the legal price of his behavior, and will care little about 
whether the damages imposed by a court are called “compensatory” or 
“restitutionary” or even “punitive”—to him, it is all the same.142
Once again, one can immediately see how useful such a theory would be 
to the bad man.  When followed,
 
143
While the bad man must have been head over heels over the Supreme 
Court’s recent ruling, a good man should be puzzled and, frankly, a bit 
troubled by all of this.  The good man should wonder whether the bad 
man’s indulgence is either necessary or desirable, even if the Supreme 
Court’s stated purpose of reigning in “stark unpredictability” of punitive 
 such a theory allows him to predict, 
with a fair degree of accuracy, how a court would rule, and thereby 
provides him with external guidance (via the threat of possible sanctions) 
regarding the appropriate precautions to take. 
 
 138. Id. at 2627 (citing Holmes, supra note 3, at 459). 
 139. Id. at 2633. 
 140. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); see infra Part 
II.B. 
 141. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 101, at 1041–44; see also Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. 
at 384 (“There was evidence that Ford could have corrected the hazardous design defects at 
minimal cost but decided to defer correction of the shortcomings by engaging in a cost-
benefit analysis balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits.”). 
 142. Holmes, supra note 3, at 461 (“[F]rom [the bad man’s] point of view, what is the 
difference between being fined and being taxed a certain sum for doing a certain thing? . . . 
What significance is there in calling one taking right and another wrong from the point of 
view of the law?  It does not matter, so far as the given consequence, the compulsory 
payment, is concerned, whether the act to which it is attached is described in terms of praise 
or in terms of blame, or whether the law purports to prohibit it or to allow it.  If it matters at 
all, still speaking from the bad man’s point of view, it must be because in one case and not in 
the other some further disadvantages, or at least some further consequences, are attached to 
the act by the law.”). 
 143. See supra note 111 (comparing scholarly commentary on judicial use of something 
akin to the Hand formula prior to its formulation in Carroll Towing). 
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damages is a noble one.  And, at this point in the discussion, one may well 
wonder whether Holmes’s theory is worth the paper it has been printed (and 
reprinted) on, and whether we should not outright abandon a theory that 
advocates the breaking of one’s solemn word whenever doing so is 
profitable, allows one to commit negligence when the benefits exceed the 
costs, and refuses to truly punish wrongdoers by making punitive damages 
so predictable that a bad man will consider them as part of the cost of doing 
business. 
If these were in fact Holmes’s views, then the above-stated criticisms 
would render his theory, in my view anyway, unpalatable.  But as I argue in 
the next part of this Article, Holmes’s views were much more complex, and 
not only permit, but actually embrace, what has been previously thought to 
be inconsistent with his views:  a good man approach to law. 
III.  SLAYING HOLMES’S JURISPRUDENTIAL DRAGON:  HOLMES’S BAD 
MAN MEETS ARISTOTLE’S GOOD MAN 
When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the 
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his 
strength.  But to get him out is only the first step.  The next is either to kill 
him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal. 
 — Oliver Wendell Holmes144
 
 
One of the biggest mistakes people make when they read Holmes (who, 
admittedly, invited such misinterpretations with his tendency to choose 
words as much for their shock value as for the meaning they convey) is to 
confuse Holmes’s enthusiasm for the bad man approach to law with a 
certain enthusiasm towards helping the bad man himself.  This approach, 
for example, has been taken by several courts145 and commentators, but 
could not be further from Holmes’s actual intentions.  Although Holmes 
certainly spilled his fair share of ink discussing the bad man, Holmes did 
not desire to help him but instead to advocate the separation of law and 
morality for the simple purpose of facilitating clear thinking146
 
 144. Holmes, supra note 
 about the 
3, at 469. 
 145. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2627 (2008) (Souter, J.); Bridgeport 
Harbor Place I, LLC v. Ganim, No. X06CV040184523S, 2008 WL 4926925, at *12 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2008) (“As cogently expressed by the Supreme Court, ‘[a] penalty should 
be reasonably predictable in its severity, so that even Justice Holmes’ ‘bad man’ can look 
ahead with some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or 
another. . . . And when the bad man’s counterparts turn up from time to time, the penalty 
scheme they face ought to threaten them with a fair probability of suffering in like degree 
when they wreak like damage . . . .  The common sense of justice would surely bar penalties 
that reasonable people would think excessive for the harm caused in the circumstances.’” 
(quoting Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2610)). 
 146. Holmes, supra note 3, at 464 (“For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not 
be a gain if every word of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether, and 
other words adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law.  
We should lose the fossil records of a good deal of history and the majesty got from ethical 
associations, but by ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we should gain very 
much in the clearness of our thought.”). 
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concept of law.147  Because the bad man does not care about moral nature 
of a right or a duty, but only about the legal consequences attached to 
violating a right or failing to perform a duty,148
But, many have wondered, does Holmes’s theory pay too much attention 
to the bad man’s point of view?
 Holmes thought that we 
should attempt to see the world from the bad man’s eyes if we were ever to 
truly understand the law. 
149  If we are to truly understand the law, 
should we not instead be concerned with the perspective of the good man, 
who follows the law for conscience’s sake and probably represents how 
most people behave and think about the law?150
In The Federalist No. 51, James Madison famously wrote:  “If men were 
angels, no government would be necessary.”
  And, if most people 
actually think about the law from the perspective of the good man, would 
not an internally based, good man view of the law tell us a lot more about 
how the law actually works?  Holmes would answer these critics in a word:  
no. 
151  Coming from the pen of 
the father of the Constitution, who was himself advocating a new form of 
government, the implication was obvious:  because men are not angels, a 
successful form of government should take this fact into account.  This 
point could hardly have been lost on Holmes, who was himself advocating a 
new theory of law, and must himself have recognized that a legal system 
would be unnecessary among a population of angels or good men, who, 
after all, could find their “reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or 
outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”152
 
 147. Recall that, according to Holmes, the bad man understood law as a prophecy about 
what the courts would do in fact, i.e., in the event that a bad man violated a legal right, or 
failed to perform a legal duty. See id. at 460–61 (“Take the fundamental question, What 
constitutes the law? . . . [I]f we take the view of our friend the bad man we shall find that he 
does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he does want to know what 
the . . . courts are likely to do in fact.  I am much of this mind.  The prophecies of what the 
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”). 
  More to the point, 
 148. Id. at 461 (“Take again a notion which as popularly understood is the widest 
conception which the law contains;—the notion of legal duty, to which already I have 
referred.  We fill the word with all the content which we draw from morals.  But what does it 
mean to a bad man?  Mainly, and in the first place, a prophecy that if he does certain things 
he will be subjected to disagreeable consequences by way of imprisonment or compulsory 
payment of money.”). 
 149. Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1773–74 (“Of what possible benefit can it be that the bad 
man calculates with certainty the contours within which vice is unrestrained?  Altruism 
proposes an altogether different standard:  the law is certain when not the bad but the 
good man is secure in the expectation that if he goes forward in good faith, with due regard 
for his neighbor’s interest as well as his own, and a suspicious eye to the temptations of 
greed, then the law will not turn up as a dagger in his back.  As for the bad man, let him 
beware; the good man’s security and his own are incompatible.”). 
 150. See Hart, supra note 32, at 932.  Discounting the importance of Holmes’s “bad man” 
theory of law, Hart wrote that Holmes’s “conclusion . . . that law is something entirely 
separate from morals,” and his suggestion that we see law from the bad man’s perspective, 
was unhelpful at best, and would “make us more effective counsellors of evil” at worst. Id.  
He went on to ask:  “Do not lots of good men obey the law, even though they might not be 
caught, and is not that fact important?” Id. 
 151. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961). 
 152. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459. 
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Holmes must have recognized, like Madison did, that in a government 
populated by bad men, a legal system, if it is to be successful, should take 
this fact into account.153
But why, in the case of either Madison or Holmes, should a successful 
government or legal system take the bad man into account, and see the 
world through the bad man’s eyes?  One reason, which has already been 
briefly touched upon, is purely descriptive:  we should take the bad man 
into account to better understand “[w]hat constitutes the law.”
  Both men, it seemed, had the bad man on their 
minds. 
154
In an underappreciated passage of significant importance, Holmes 
analogizes the bad man to a dragon for a very specific purpose: 
  We can 
do this, according to Holmes, by stripping the law bare, and seeing how it 
actually works in practice.  Although this descriptive component was an 
important part of Holmes’s agenda, it is too often emphasized as Holmes’s 
primary aim, whereas it was actually the beginning of a larger normative 
enterprise. 
When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the 
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his 
strength.  But to get him out is only the first step.  The next is either to kill 
him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal.155
Just as a knight would lure a dragon out of his cave and “count his teeth 
and claws”
 
156
 
 153. In fact, Holmes himself could have written:  “If men were angels, no system of laws 
would be necessary, but because the bad man exists, a system of law taking into account this 
fact is necessary.” 
 to see what sort of an enemy he is up against, so too would 
someone like Madison or Holmes wish to see what sort of an enemy he is 
up against by removing morality from the equation to see the world through 
the bad man’s eyes.  If this is all there was to Holmes’s agenda, we should 
be very disappointed indeed, for the same reason that legal reformers are 
disappointed with those within the critical legal studies movement who 
would tear down sacred institutions while leaving nothing in their place.  
But in the very next sentence, Holmes reveals a much grander normative 
vision:  the knight sizes up the dragon for the sake of doing one of two 
things:  taming him, or killing him.  There is an analogue in our 
understanding of the bad man.  The knight is the good man, who must size 
up the bad man not merely for the sake of understanding the law, but for the 
purpose of making the law effective by either taming the bad man (i.e., 
reforming him internally), or killing him (i.e., imposing external sanctions 
to reform him externally). 
 154. Id. at 460; see Fisch, supra note 27, at 1595, 1612.  Professor Jill E. Fisch notes that 
although Holmes’s “bad man label is strikingly normative,” Holmes’s “purpose in describing 
the separation of law and morals was to help us understand what the law is, not to argue for 
what it should be.” Id. 
 155. Holmes, supra note 3, at 469. 
 156. Id. 
2106 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
Thus, in response to our original question “why should a government or 
legal system be preoccupied with the bad man?” Holmes provides two non-
mutually exclusive explanations:  one internal, and the other external. 
First, one can focus on the bad man to reform his soul by making him 
become more like a good man, thereby allowing him to better govern 
himself, internally, through his more refined and developed inner “sanctions 
of conscience.”157
A.  Bridging the Moral-Legal Divide Part I:  Aristotle’s Good Man and the 
Internal Point of View 
  Alternatively, one can focus on the bad man with a 
desire to shape his actions by making him behave more like a good man, 
not for the purpose of actually making him good (though this would be a 
welcome benefit), but to better deal with those recalcitrant individuals 
through the external sanctions of the law who have proven that they are 
beyond internal reform.  In the remainder of this Article, I flesh out this 
underappreciated portion of Holmes’s vision, and show how it makes a 
difference in the way we ought to understand both Holmes’s theory and the 
law itself.  In the process, I hope to show Holmes’s theory as one that is 
much more normatively palatable than has been previously acknowledged, 
in that it focuses on the bad man not for his own sake, but for the sake of 
the good man, at least so far as Holmes understood this term. 
The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life.  Its history is 
the history of the moral development of the race.  The practice of it, in 
spite of popular jests, tends to make good citizens and good men. 
 — Oliver Wendell Holmes158
 
 
Besides a seemingly offbeat reference Holmes made to taming a dragon, 
what evidence do we have for believing that Holmes thought the bad man 
could be reformed through the vehicle of law, a claim that has been 
specifically doubted elsewhere?159  Early in his speech, shortly after he 
introduced the bad man in an attempt to “dispel a confusion between 
morality and law,”160
 
 157. Id. at 459. 
 Holmes, recognizing the possibility that he might be 
misunderstood, offered the following cautionary statement: 
 158. Id. 
 159. See KRONMAN, supra note 26, at 126 (“A bad man may become an expert in 
[predicting how judges will behave] without ceasing to be bad, that is, without acquiring any 
of the public-spirited concerns that motivate judges.  Holmes assumed that a person can 
possess an expert understanding of judicial behavior but continue to be bad himself.  He 
assumed, to put it differently, that the acquisition of such expertise does not require that one 
be, or have the effect of turning one into, a good man motivated by the unselfish concerns of 
a judge.”). 
 160. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459; see also id. at 459–60 (“The law is full of phraseology 
drawn from morals, and by the mere force of language continually invites us to pass from 
one domain to the other without perceiving it, as we are sure to do unless we have the 
boundary constantly before our minds.”); Robin West, Unenumerated Duties, 9 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 221, 253 (2006) (“In an address called The Path of the Law, Holmes famously 
worried over a century ago that our tendency to drench legal concepts in moralism would 
render the former less than clear and most decidedly less than liberating.”). 
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I take it for granted that no hearer of mine will misinterpret what I have to 
say as the language of cynicism.  The law is the witness and external 
deposit of our moral life.  Its history is the history of the moral 
development of the race.  The practice of it, in spite of popular jests, tends 
to make good citizens and good men.  When I emphasize the difference 
between law and morals I do so with reference to a single end, that of 
learning and understanding the law.  For that purpose you must definitely 
master its specific marks, and it is for that that I ask you for the moment 
to imagine yourselves indifferent to other and greater things.161
Unfortunately for Holmes, his request has been unkindly ignored since 
the moment it was uttered.  But if we take Holmes at his word and let him 
speak for himself, he offers us several important clues regarding how the 
law is to be understood.  First, he makes clear that he believes that the law 
is fundamentally moral, in that the laws that currently exist were, when they 
were first promulgated, essentially moral laws,
 
162 and are still, in some 
sense, limited by morality.163  Further, he makes clear that he is not asking 
us to disentangle morality from law to be a villain,164 but to help us 
understand the law.165  And third, in what must be the most ignored 
sentence in all of Holmes’s writings, he believes that a proper 
understanding of the law is important not for its own sake, but because, in 
part, it allows one to “tame” (by reforming their behavior internally) those 
who would transgress the law’s moral dictates through “practice” or 
habit.166
Holmes’s idea that a bad man may become good by habit is, somewhat 
shockingly, a quintessentially Aristotelian idea, and could have been written 
by the father of natural law himself.  Indeed, viewed through an Aristotelian 
lens, which Holmes himself peeked through from time to time, Holmes’s 
thought takes on an entirely different significance.  Several thousand years 
before Holmes said that “[t]he practice of [law] tends to make good citizens 
and good men,”
 
167 Aristotle himself recognized that “[m]oral goodness . . . 
is the result of habit,” as “none of the moral virtues is engendered in us by 
nature, since nothing that is what it is by nature can be made to behave 
differently by habituation.”168
 
 161. Holmes, supra note 
  Thus, according to Aristotle, the only way of 
3, at 459 (emphasis added). 
 162. Id. (“The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life.  Its history is the 
history of the moral development of the race.”). 
 163. Id. at 460 (“No doubt simple and extreme cases can be put of imaginable laws which 
the statute-making power would not dare to enact, even in the absence of written 
constitutional prohibitions, because the community would rise in rebellion and fight; and this 
gives some plausibility to the proposition that the law, if not a part of morality, is limited by 
it.”). 
 164. Seipp, supra note 27, at 552 (“Holmes was ‘the bad man.’”). 
 165. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459 (“When I emphasize the difference between law and 
morals I do so with reference to a single end, that of learning and understanding the law.”). 
 166. Id. at 459, 469. 
 167. Id. 
 168. ARISTOTLE, supra note 84, at 31; see also id. at 32 (“Men will become good builders 
as a result of building well, and bad ones as a result of building badly.  Otherwise there 
would be no need of anyone to teach them:  they would all be born either good or bad.  Now 
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becoming just was to act justly, for although “we are constituted by nature 
to receive” moral virtues, “their full development in us is due to habit.”169  
Of course, this begs the question:  how does one begin to act justly in the 
first place?  As with Holmes,170
Anything that we have to learn to do we learn by the actual doing of it:  
people become builders by building and instrumentalists by playing 
instruments.  Similarly we become just by performing just acts, temperate 
by performing temperate ones, brave by performing brave ones.  This 
view is supported by what happens in city-states.  Legislators make their 
citizens good by habituation; this is the intention of every legislator, and 
those who do not carry it out fail of their object.  This is what makes the 
difference between a good constitution and a bad one.
 Aristotle recognized that it was through the 
practice of following just laws, which legislators have laid down for this 
very purpose: 
171
In this passage, Aristotle tells us that people become just by habit, and 
individuals habitually practicing just laws will tend to internalize the 
particular moral characteristics manifested in these external promulgations 
of public morality.  Further, he suggests that the lawmaker (and, by 
extension, our common law judges) should legislate (or decide tough cases) 
with this fact in mind.  Furthermore, because Aristotle believed that 
individuals do not possess moral goodness ex nihilo,
 
172 the internal good 
man perspective cannot even begin to operate until moral content is poured 
into an essentially amoral vessel, whereby what was once external begins 
the process of ossification into an internal point of view.173
It should be noted that, according to Aristotle, the bad man will never 
truly become good until his acts become sufficiently internalized to become 
what Holmes terms part of the good man’s inner “sanctions of 
conscience.”
 
174  But, as Aristotle recognized, through practice175 this is 
possible, and one could soon become virtuous176
 
this holds good also of the virtues.  It is the way that we behave in our dealings with other 
people that makes us just or unjust . . . .”). 
 and good. 
 169. Id. at 31. 
 170. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459 (“The practice of [the law], in spite of popular jests, 
tends to make good citizens and good men.”). 
 171. ARISTOTLE, supra note 84, at 32. 
 172. Id. (“Men will become good builders as a result of building well, and bad ones as a 
result of building badly.  Otherwise there would be no need of anyone to teach them:  they 
would all be born either good or bad.”). 
 173. Perhaps, indeed, the best way of beginning such a process is to impose external 
sanctions, as per Holmes; for again, according to Aristotle, there are no internal standards 
before this time to guide behavior. 
 174. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459; see ARISTOTLE, supra note 84, at 37.  Aristotle himself 
recognizes that 
virtuous acts are not done in a just or temperate way merely because they have a 
certain quality [e.g., conforming to the external requirements imposed by law], but 
only if the agent also acts in a certain state, that is (1) if he knows what he is doing, 
(2) if he chooses it, and chooses it for its own sake [i.e., not for the sake of 
avoiding a legal sanction], and (3) if he does it from a fixed and permanent 
disposition. 
Id. (second emphasis added). 
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Because it was Holmes who, perhaps better than anyone else, articulated 
a theory that can help realize Aristotle’s dream of making men virtuous—if 
not initially due to the good man’s own inner conscious, then due to the bad 
man’s continual practice177—he is probably better thought of as the good 
man’s friend than the law’s villain.  Indeed, there is no incompatibility with 
encouraging the good man to be governed by his inner “sanctions of 
conscience,” on the one hand, and attempting to reform the moral fabric of 
the bad man by requiring him to perform just actions for the purpose of 
becoming just, on the other.  In fact, it may be argued, Holmes’s bad man 
theory of law does a better job of making men virtuous than a purely 
internal point of view, for as Aristotle himself recognized, the difficulty in 
saying that “people must perform just actions if they are to become just” is 
that those who “do what is just and temperate . . . are just and temperate 
already.”178
If Aristotle and Holmes are correct, then the practice of law, at least 
where such laws are just, will increase the ranks of good men.  There will, 
however, always be those who remain, despite the best efforts of the good 
man, bad.  For these “dragons of the law” who have failed to internalize the 
law’s inner teachings,
  This, indeed, is the contradiction of the internal framework.  
Holmes’s theory, far from being unfavorably disposed toward the good 
man, helps add to his ranks, whereas a purely internal theory would not be 
capable of helping those who are not already good and just become good 
and just. 
179
 
 we, like the knight, will need another weapon to 
fight them.  That sword, according to Holmes, is the external sanction. 
B.  Bridging the Moral-Legal Divide Part II:  Holmes’s Bad Man and the 
External Point of View 
A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and 
practised by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to 
avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail if he 
can. 
 — Oliver Wendell Holmes180
 
 
 
 175. Which can be supplied with the gentle prodding of external sanctions, as will be 
discussed in Part III.C, infra. 
 176. ARISTOTLE, supra note 84, at 37–38 (“[I]t is from the repeated performance of just 
and temperate acts that we acquire virtues.”). 
 177. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459 (“The practice of [law], in spite of popular jests, tends 
to make good citizens and good men.”); cf. ARISTOTLE, supra note 84, at 37 (“[P]eople must 
perform just actions if they are to become just . . . .”); id. at 31 (“Moral goodness . . . is the 
result of habit.”). 
 178. ARISTOTLE, supra note 84, at 37. 
 179. Or, worse yet, have internalized the bad man’s point of view. See, e.g., Alschuler, 
supra note 27, at 375 n.84 (“[M]y argument is that ‘the bad man has crept into the collective 
unconscious of the legal profession.’  Once people internalize the ‘bad man’ perspective, the 
assumption that easily evaded law is not law becomes routine.  Because that is what Holmes’ 
definition says, it encourages the view that taking advantage of loopholes is unproblematic 
and that nearly everyone will do so.”). 
 180. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459. 
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In the previous section I discussed how Holmes’s bad man theory of law 
reflects, in part, an Aristotelian theory of law that recognized law’s ability 
to help make the bad man good through his habit of continually practicing 
(or obeying) just laws.  In this section, I discuss Holmes’s specific focus on 
those individuals who, despite the best attempts of the good man, 
nevertheless fail to internalize the law’s inner morality.  For these 
individuals, according to Holmes, we can never hope to explain how the 
law actually works by recourse to a purely internal point of view.  More 
specifically, if one views—as Holmes did—a legislature’s or judge’s181
Holmes’s external view of law, of course, has been heavily criticized 
over the years.  Some have accused it as being antagonistic to the good man 
approach to law,
 job 
as requiring the making, interpreting, and applying of laws for a population 
containing few angels, one will probably experience little success dealing 
with these bad men of the law without adopting an external view of law.  
The remainder of this section attempts to show why this is so. 
182 corrupting,183 misplaced,184 and woefully 
incomplete.185  To look at the matter this way, it seems to me, is to 
completely misread Holmes.  As I have argued above,186 Holmes was 
sensitive to the internal point of view, and recognized that “[t]he law is the 
witness and external deposit of our moral life” and encapsulated “the 
history of the moral development of the race.”187
 
 181. It is important to note that Holmes thought of judges as legislators or “‘law-makers,’ 
continuously engaged in making and revising ‘policies’ to provide ‘expedient’ solutions for 
new social problems.” ROSENBERG, supra note 
  His focus on the external 
74, at 4. 
 182. Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1773–74 (“Of what possible benefit can it be that the bad 
man calculates with certainty the contours within which vice is unrestrained?  Altruism 
proposes an altogether different standard:  the law is certain when not the bad but the 
good man is secure in the expectation that if he goes forward in good faith, with due regard 
for his neighbor’s interest as well as his own, and a suspicious eye to the temptations of 
greed, then the law will not turn up as a dagger in his back.  As for the bad man, let him 
beware; the good man’s security and his own are incompatible.”). 
 183. Hart, supra note 32, at 932 (arguing that Holmes’s suggestion that we see law from 
the bad man’s perspective, was unhelpful at best, and would “make us more effective 
counsellors of evil” at worst). 
 184. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 39–40 (1961) (wondering why the law should 
be concerned exclusively with the “bad man” rather than, for example, the “puzzled man” or 
the “ignorant man” or with the “man who wishes to arrange his affairs,” all of whom are 
“willing to do what is required, if only he can be told what it is”). 
 185. See, e.g., id. (“It is of course very important, if we are to understand the law, to see 
how the courts administer it when they come to apply its sanctions.  But this should not lead 
us to think that all there is to understand is what happens in courts.”); Hart, supra note 32, at 
932 (“Do not lots of good men obey the law, even though they might not be caught, and is 
not that fact important?”); Dale A. Nance, Rules, Standards, and the Internal Point of View, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1287, 1295 (2006) (“Much modern theorizing about law has failed to 
recognize the full importance of maintaining and cultivating the internal point of view 
among the citizenry.  The ‘bad man’ theory of legal obligation is perhaps the most 
conspicuous failure in this regard.  When Holmes gave his famous ‘bad man’ speech, ‘The 
Path of the Law,’ at Boston University School of Law, he was advising students on the best 
way to think of legal obligation and, therefore, the best way to advise clients. . . . Yet, it is 
hardly the best way to preserve and cultivate the internal point of view among the citizenry 
to have lawyers advising clients by taking the external point of view.”). 
 186. See supra Part III.A. 
 187. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459. 
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point of view, therefore, was undertaken not to disparage the internal point 
of view, but to strengthen it by protecting its most devout practitioners—the 
good men. 
Our first job, therefore, is to dispel the myth that adopting an external 
view of the law automatically entails a rejection of the internal, good man 
approach to law.  No less a figure than Aristotle himself, the father of virtue 
ethics and firm believer that laws should be enacted to make more men 
virtuous, adopted an external (and anachronistically Holmesian) view of 
law: 
For it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man 
or a bad man a good one, nor whether it is a good or a bad man that has 
committed adultery; the law looks only to the distinctive character of the 
injury, and treats the parties as equals, if one is in the wrong and the other 
is being wronged, and if one inflicted injury and the other has received 
it.188
These words, it seems, could have been penned by Holmes himself!  But 
why would the developer of the good man approach adopt a purely external 
approach?  What, in other words, can be gained by such a move? 
 
As discussed earlier,189
It must be remembered that Holmes dedicated his life to the law, and 
understood, perhaps better than anyone else, that law not only had its basis 
in morality,
 Aristotle, like Holmes, understood that people 
tend to become just by following just laws, and saw this as a normatively 
important component of the law.  But Aristotle, like Holmes, also 
recognized that the internal point of view could only explain why those who 
had already internalized law’s inner morality behaved as they did.  It could 
say little, however, about how people came to behave morally in the first 
place, or why those who rejected law’s inner morality still appeared to 
conform to the law’s dictates, and appeared to behave as though they were 
moral and as though they were governed by the same “sanctions of 
conscience” as the good man himself.  According to Holmes, one cannot 
hope to explain the behavior of these individuals, or to understand how 
legislatures and judges might affect their behavior, without recourse to an 
external point of view, and it is for this reason that Holmes adopted such a 
view. 
190 but depended for its very existence on the continuing support 
of the community.191
 
 188. 2 ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE:  THE 
REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION bk. V, 1132a2–a9, 1132a19, at 1786 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 
Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (c. 384 B.C.E.). 
  But he served in the Civil War and sat on the federal 
and state bench as well, and knew from these experiences that many 
individuals were not governed by their “vaguer sanctions of conscience,” 
 189. See supra Part III.A. 
 190. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459 (“The law is the witness and external deposit of our 
moral life.  Its history is the history of the moral development of the race.”). 
 191. Id. at 460 (“I once heard the late Professor Agassiz say that a German population 
would rise if you added two cents to the price of a glass of beer.  A statute in such a case 
would be empty words, not because it was wrong, but because it could not be enforced.”). 
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but needed external sanctions to shape their behavior to the general 
standards adopted by the community.  Therefore, for Holmes, the purpose 
of adopting the external point of view was to understand how the law 
actually works to impose order on those initially resistant, and the best way 
of doing this was, in Holmes’s view, to understand the bad man.192
So how, exactly, is the bad man to be understood?  What, exactly, guides 
his behavior?  First, it must be recalled that a bad man will not look to the 
law as a statement of right and wrong, for morality does not play a role in 
his calculations.  Nor will the bad man be compelled to follow the law’s 
commands out of a desire to become a good man himself, or out of any 
deep respect for those who make (or follow) the law.  Rather, the bad man 
will only understand law in terms of the “material consequences which such 
knowledge enables him to predict,”
 
193 and will therefore only look at the 
material consequences, i.e., the predicted punishment194 that will be 
imposed on him for violating the law, in deciding whether or not to comply 
with the law’s demands.195  Indeed, it is this view—the bad man’s view that 
violation of the law is a “cost of doing business” whenever the bad man’s 
business runs counter to the spirit and letter of the law—to which courts and 
commentators most often object.196
So how, exactly, does Holmes’s bad man decide upon a course of action?  
According to Professor Albert W. Alschuler, the bad man acts even worse 
than Holmes himself imagined: 
 
Holmes should have visited with the bad man longer.  Contrary to what 
this scoundrel told Holmes, he did not care two straws for what the 
 
 192. Id. at 469 (“When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the 
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength.”). 
 193. Id. at 459. 
 194. Holmes refers to this as the bad man’s “prophecies of what the courts will do in 
fact.” Id. at 461; see also Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) 
(Holmes, J.) (defining law as “a statement of the circumstances in which the public force 
will be brought to bear upon men through the courts”); 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra 
note 37, at 212 (“It starts from my definition of law (in the sense in which it is used by the 
modern lawyer), as a statement of the circumstances in which the public force will be 
brought to bear upon men through the courts:  that is the prophecy in general terms.”). 
 195. It is for this reason that Holmes said, nearly a full century before the law and 
economics movement really gained momentum, that the “man of the future” is the man of 
economics, Holmes, supra note 3, at 469, for it is the economist who will best understand the 
cost-benefit analyses in which the bad man engages whenever deciding whether or not to 
obey a certain law. 
 196. Indeed, the “bad man” view of the law has been cited as a reason to dismiss an 
argument by the losing party, as in Goldberg v. City of Atl. City, 4 N.J. Tax 195 (N.J. Tax Ct. 
1982), where the court, citing General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649 
(2d Cir. 1974), agreed that the rules of professional conduct are not written for a bad man 
reading and held that a law firm cannot gain consent to a conflict of interest when a public 
interest is involved, contrary to the firm’s argument. Goldberg, 4 N.J. Tax at 200, 213.  
Similarly, the “bad man” view of the law has been cited by judges as a reason to interpret a 
statute in a particular way so to prevent promoting a “bad man” style of interpreting a 
statute, as in Cuevas v. Royal D’Iberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346 (Miss. 1986), where a 
dissenting justice argued that the government should not be indifferent to a hotel’s choice 
when the hotel chose to violate the law and pay penalties for violation of a local alcoholic 
beverage control law. Id. at 356–57 (Robertson, J., dissenting). 
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Massachusetts or English courts would do in fact.  He cared what the 
sheriff would do.  The sheriff, not the courts, had the guns, the padlocks, 
the battering rams, the handcuffs, the nightsticks, the dogs, the deputies, 
and the jails.  What the courts did might predict what the sheriff would 
do, just as axioms and deductions might predict what the courts would do.  
In the end, however, the bad man was concerned about the sheriff.  If, 
after the courts had spoken, the sheriff would take a bribe and permit the 
bad man to flee to Rio, the bad man would laugh at the axioms, the 
deductions, the courts of Massachusetts, and the courts of England all 
together.197
Although written somewhat facetiously and intended as a criticism of 
Holmes’s theory, this statement is not really that troublesome for Holmes 
after all.  The problem, in fact, with Professor Alschuler’s statement is not 
that it goes too far, but that it does not go far enough.  The bad man, it will 
be shown, is worried about much more than Alschuler himself imagined. 
 
So what is a bad man concerned about when deciding upon a particular 
course of (potentially illegal) action?  First and foremost, he is wondering 
whether he will be caught, and therefore cares about the probability that 
someone will report him.  Next, he wants to know whether, if reported, he 
will be captured, and therefore is interested in the probability of the sheriff 
arresting him.  If arrested, he is worried about the chance of being charged 
with an offense, and wants to know about the prosecutor who may 
prosecute him, the jury who may determine his guilt or innocence, and the 
judge who may sentence him, in order to determine how likely he is to pass 
through this ordeal unscathed.  And he also wants to know the 
consequences attached to each of these events.  How bad, after all, will 
prison, or a fine, really be?  For this, the bad man will want to know about 
the warden in charge of his prison, the guards who will oversee his 
activities, and the other prisoners who he may be locked up with, and on, 
and on, and on.198
In short, at each stage of analysis, what the bad man really cares about is 
the probability of a cost (broadly defined) being imposed on him, multiplied 
by the quantum of that cost.
 
199
 
 197. Alschuler, supra note 
  Behind this logic is Holmes’s assumption 
27, at 372. 
 198. See Fisch, supra note 27, at 1597 (“An additional concern is the extent to which the 
bad man will be constrained by legal sanctions.  Some commentators have worried that, in 
predicting the cost of disobeying the law, the bad man will not simply calculate the cost of 
legal sanctions, but will further consider the likelihood that those sanctions will be imposed.  
Robert Gordon terms this a ‘restate[ment] . . . [of the Holmesian] “bad man’s” view of legal 
rules as prices discounted by sanctions—or, to reduce it still further, by the probability of 
enforcement of sanctions.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Robert W. Gordon, A New Role 
for Lawyers?:  The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1192 (2003)) 
(citing Williams, supra note 71, at 1291)).  Professor Fisch ultimately rejects this view, 
however, and notes that “[a]lthough this reading of Holmes is plausible, I do not 
read Holmes as incorporating the risk of nonenforcement into the bad man’s calculation.” Id. 
 199. Because Holmes was originally giving his speech to law students (i.e., future 
lawyers), it is probably the case that he was concerned about how they ought to understand 
the law, and probably formulated his bad man theory with them in mind, rather than the bad 
man himself. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, Holmes Versus Hart:  The Bad Man in Legal 
Theory, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE, supra note 26, at 158, 179 (explaining 
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that, although the bad man cannot be influenced by morality, he is by nature 
a rational animal,200 and can be influenced by the threat of sanctions.201  
The bad man, in short, is the calculating man.202
This understanding allows us to see what we are up against by, in 
Holmes’s words, getting “the dragon out of his cave” and “count[ing] his 
teeth and claws, and see[ing] just what is his strength.”
 
203  But Holmes is 
also quick to remind us that this “is only the first step.”204  We—and here 
Holmes was speaking primarily to the good men among us—must next 
decide “either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal.”205  
But how, exactly, does one accomplish this?  In the very next sentence, 
Holmes tells us that it is through economics:  “For the rational study of the 
law the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the 
future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.”206
It is “the man of statistics and the master of economics” who is best 
equipped to deal with the bad man’s behavior, not only by understanding 
that the bad man is, at his core, a calculating man
 
207 motivated by external 
sanctions,208 but by understanding how best to manipulate these sanctions 
to influence the bad man’s behavior for the good of the entire polity.209
 
that Holmes is predicting the law not from the bad man’s point of view about the probability 
of enforcement, but from the perspective of courts and legislatures about the threat of legal 
liability).  However, in either case, Holmes was fundamentally concerned about a prediction, 
or what Holmes calls a “prophecy” of what the enforcement authorities would do on a going 
forward basis. 
  
A bad man contemplating his crime at an early stage, of course, generally needed to take 
a lot more factors into account (i.e., make more predictions) than a lawyer advising his client 
about the legal ramifications of acts already committed, but both the bad man and his lawyer 
were in the business of predicting.  In other words, Holmes probably assumed in articulating 
his thesis that lawyers were not generally in the business of advising their clients, from the 
beginning, as to whether or not they should break a contract, break into a home, or punch a 
person in the nose.  Rather, Holmes seemed to assume that the client has already broken her 
contract, or entered into a home, or punched another in the nose, and the lawyer is now being 
called upon to advise his or her client of the possible repercussions, or to predict, in other 
words, what a court was likely to do. 
 200. Here again we see affinities with Aristotle, who defined man as a “rational animal.” 
See William C. French, Natural Law and Ecological Responsibility:  Drawing on the 
Thomistic Tradition, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 12, 18 (2008). 
 201. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459 (“A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is 
believed and practised by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid 
being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail if he can.”). 
 202. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 298 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1960) (“Men calculate, 
some with less exactness, indeed, some with more:  but all men calculate.  I would not say, 
that even a madman does not calculate.”). 
 203. Holmes, supra note 3, at 469. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. BENTHAM, supra note 202, at 298. 
 208. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459. 
 209. HOLMES, supra note 47, at 36 (“The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that 
it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right 
or wrong.”). 
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Elaborating on this point several paragraphs later, Holmes discusses how it 
is through economics that the good man judge will be able 
to consider and weigh the ends of legislation, the means of attaining them, 
and the cost.  We learn that for everything we have to give up something 
else, and we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the other 
advantage we lose, and to know what we are doing when we elect.210
Holmes, in other words, understood that courts were in the business of 
“making policies that necessarily balanced the conflicting interests of 
different classes and ideologies vying for ascendance in the harsh and 
crowded conditions of industrial society.”
 
211  Therefore, for Holmes, we 
ought to begin by recognizing “the legal reality of judges exercising a 
discretionary power to make policies motivated not by dictates of logic but 
by ‘experience’ of the ‘relative worth and importance of competing 
legislative grounds’ of social needs and values.”212
Understood in this context, it now becomes clear why Holmes said that 
although the man of the present may be the doctrinal black-letter man, the 
man of the future would be the man of economics.  For only with an 
understanding of the costs and benefits of a particular policy could one be 
in the position to choose the best policy for the polity. 
 
The external point of view, therefore, far from abandoning the good man 
view of law or, worse, abandoning the “concepts of right and wrong—[and] 
values,”213
Thus, at its core, Holmes’s insistence on the separation of law and 
morality exists to help us understand the bad man view of law, which in 
turn helps us understand why the bad man behaves as he does,
 actually helps further the good man’s agenda.  It promotes the 
concepts of right and wrong, at least as these values—which are brought 
about by weighing the cost of the bad man’s conduct and the law’s interest 
in deterring him against the costs of enforcing the legal rules necessary to 
“tame” or immobilize the bad man—are understood by the community 
practicing them. 
214
 
 210. Holmes, supra note 
 which in 
3, at 474. 
 211. ROSENBERG, supra note 74, at 3. 
 212. Id. (quoting HOLMES, supra note 47, at 5; Holmes, supra note 3, at 466). 
 213. Robert Henry, The Value(s) of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.:  Through a Magic 
Mirror Darkly, THE GREEN BAG, Autumn 2001, at 105, 105 (reviewing ALSCHULER, supra 
note 26).  Those who suggest that Holmes advocated a purely external point of view for 
understanding the law are therefore only right in part.  And those scholars who suggest, as 
Alschuler does, that Holmes was revolting not “against formalism or against a priori 
reasoning,” but instead “against the objective concepts of right and wrong—against values,” 
id., could not be further from the truth. 
 214. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459 (“The first thing for a business-like understanding of 
the matter is to understand its limits, and therefore I think it desirable at once to point out 
and dispel a confusion between morality and law, which sometimes rises to the height of 
conscious theory, and more often and indeed constantly is making trouble in detail without 
reaching the point of consciousness.  You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much 
reason as a good one for wishing to avoid an encounter with the public force, and therefore 
you can see the practical importance of the distinction between morality and law.  A man 
who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practised by his neighbors is 
likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want to 
keep out of jail if he can.”). 
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turn helps us deter the bad man, which in turn helps us protect the good 
man. 
C.  Bridging the Moral-Legal Divide Part III:  Aristotle’s Good Man Meets 
Holmes’s Bad Man—the Mixed Approach 
I have previously discussed Holmes’s acknowledgment of the internal, 
good man approach to law,215 and have argued that his adoption of the 
external, bad man approach to law, far from ignoring the good man, 
actually operates to his benefit.216
This point was in fact recognized over two thousand years ago by 
Aristotle, who—again in words that could have been penned by Holmes 
himself—not only acknowledged that “a man becomes just by the 
performance of just, and temperate by the performance of temperate, acts,” 
as we have already seen, but further recognized that there does not exist 
“the smallest likelihood of any man’s becoming good by not doing [good 
and just acts].”
  In this section, I show how Holmes did 
not view the internal and external approaches to law as mutually exclusive, 
but as mutually complementary, and believed that these approaches can and 
should be synthesized not only in a normatively satisfying manner, but in a 
very particular way.  Specifically, I argue that Holmes believed that 
although the good man approach to law was important, it was also, in and 
of itself, inadequate, in that the adoption of a good man approach to law 
would not necessarily lead to more good men. 
217
In this important passage, Aristotle argues that good hearts are not 
enough to make a person just;
 
218 rather, good acts of the sort contemplated 
by legislatures and judges when they make new laws are necessary as well.  
Holmes also understood this fact, and frequently acknowledged that a good 
heart coupled with a bad act was still rightly punishable by law.219
But so was the purely external point of view.  Aristotle recognized that 
good acts practiced by the bad man due only to the threat of external 
sanctions are, in and of themselves, insufficient to make the bad man good.  
For a bad man to become good, the good act must be performed with a 
  A 
purely internal point of view, it seems, was rejected by both Aristotle and 
Holmes as unable to explain how the law actually worked. 
 
 215. See supra Part III.A. 
 216. See supra Part III.B. 
 217. ARISTOTLE, supra note 84, at 38. 
 218. Aristotle thought that a person with a good heart who failed to perform good acts, 
but who nevertheless considered himself just, was “like [an] invalid[] who listen[s] carefully 
to their doctor, but carr[ies] out none of his instructions.  Just as the bodies of the latter will 
get no benefit from such treatment, so the souls of the former will get none from such 
philosophy.” Id. 
 219. HOLMES, supra note 47, at 33 (“[W]hile the terminology of morals is still retained, 
and while the law does still and always, in a certain sense, measure legal liability by moral 
standards, it nevertheless, by the very necessity of its nature, is continually transmuting those 
moral standards into external or objective ones, from which the actual guilt of the party 
concerned is wholly eliminated.”). 
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good heart.220
If I do live with others they tell me that I must do and abstain from doing 
various things or they will put the screws on to me.  I believe that they 
will, and being of the same mind as to their conduct I not only accept the 
rules but come in time to accept them with sympathy and emotional 
affirmation and begin to talk about duties and rights.
  Turning to Holmes, this view seems to suggest, at first blush 
anyway, that it is impossible for the bad man to ever become good, for the 
bad man is someone who, by definition, is not moved to act based on his 
internal conscience, but out of fear of external sanctions.  He is incapable, 
in other words, of uniting the good heart with the good act.  But Holmes, in 
fact, thought that these approaches could be synthesized, and acknowledged 
that although the bad man may behave justly only by threat of external 
sanctions, and therefore not be just himself, the bad man may, over time, 
come to internalize the behavior he has repeatedly practiced, even though 
such practice was originally motivated by threat of external sanctions: 
221
In this remarkable passage, Holmes demonstrates how the bad man, who 
originally behaves in a certain way and follows certain laws only to avoid 
having “the screws” put on to him, may, through habituation and continual 
practice, come to “accept [these rules] with sympathy,” and will soon come 
to follow the law not due to his fear of the law’s external sanctions, but due 
to his internal respect for the law’s inner principles, which now reside deep 
within his “sanctions of conscience.”  Holmes therefore demonstrates how, 
by first distinguishing morality from law and analytically separating the 
internal and external points of view, one may come to understand what the 
bad man view of law has to offer the legislator or judge by way of 
reforming the bad man and protecting the good,
 
222 thereby allowing the 
purely external point of view to be synthesized with the purely internal 
point of view to constitute a descriptively complete223
 
 220. ARISTOTLE, supra note 
 and normatively 
84, at 38 (“Acts, to be sure, are called just and temperate 
when they are such as a just or temperate man would do; but what makes the agent just or 
temperate is not merely the fact that he does such things, but the fact that he does them in the 
way that just and temperate men do.”). 
 221. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1918). 
 222. Professor Robin West came close to grasping this insight when he wrote (but did not 
see that Holmes himself would have agreed, and suggested as much himself): 
[I]t might behoove us to attend to the negative implication of Holmes’ The Path of 
the Law argument.  Maybe Holmes was right when he insisted we should think 
about the law’s mandates from the perspective of the “bad man.”  But it might also 
be true (in fact it might even follow from that Holmesian claim) that we should 
think about the distinctively moral questions regarding what lawmakers ought to 
do, including those moral questions with constitutional overtones, from the 
perspective of the moral man or woman who legislates, rather than so relentlessly 
from the perspective of the bad man who seeks to minimize law’s impact.  There 
are likely strong moral arguments to the effect that legislators are under moral 
imperatives to use their power for good . . . . 
West, supra note 160, at 254–55. 
 223. The view is descriptively complete because it does not pit the internal point of view 
against the external point of view, but recognizes that both operate coextensively, and that 
many rational individuals consider both the external ramifications of their actions and the 
internal rightness or wrongness of their behavior before engaging in many forms of conduct. 
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satisfying224 vision of law.225  Under Holmes’s approach, in sum, the bad 
man may become the good226 man.227
Even so great a legal philosopher as H.L.A. Hart seems to have missed 
this point.  In his otherwise impressive work, The Concept of Law, Hart 
noted that one of the problems with Holmes’s bad man approach to law was 
that it assumed individuals only act to avoid sanctions, thereby defining the 
internal point of view “out of existence.”
 
228  But this way of thinking, 
though common,229
 
 224. The view is also normatively satisfying because it better protects the good man by 
more effectively deterring the bad man, while converting him to the good man’s cause. 
 reads only one half of Holmes while ignoring the other.  
 225. See, e.g., Finkelstein, supra note 19, at 1213 (“[While] the bad man adopts only an 
external perspective on the law [and] looks at law as a basis for predicting what others will 
do[,] . . . the person who seizes the law’s internal aspect will look at legal restrictions as a 
signal that he should behave in a certain way; it provides him with a reason for behaving as 
the law demands.”); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 591, 603 (1996) (“The law can discourage [conduct] not just by ‘raising the cost’ of 
such behavior through punishments, but also through instilling aversions to the kinds of 
behavior that the law prohibits.”); Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights 
Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1401 (1999) (“[T]he most effective form of law-
enforcement is not the imposition of external sanction, but the inculcation of internal 
obedience.”); Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment:  The 
Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 75 (2007) (“General deterrence operates not only, or even primarily, 
through external restraints, that is, because subjects hear and fear the relevant sovereign’s 
commands backed by threats.  The criminal law also deters through its long-term role in 
shaping, strengthening, and inculcating values, which encourages the development of 
habitual, internal restraints . . . .”). 
 226. The word “good” should not be taken in an absolutist sense here, for Holmes 
believed in a sort of relativistic truth based on the will of the majority, see, e.g., Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority has a 
right “to embody their opinions in law”), and not in anything like the idea of natural rights 
and natural law. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 221, at 41 (“The jurists who believe in natural 
law seem to me to be in that naive state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and 
accepted by them and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men 
everywhere.”); see also Harold J. Laski, The Political Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes, 40 
YALE L.J. 683, 685 (1931) (“Mr. Justice Holmes’ political outlook is a rejection of absolutist 
concepts.  All principles are true in merely a relative way.  The individual is not a subject of 
rights which the state is not entitled to invade.  Men are social animals; and what they are 
entitled to do is a matter of degree, born of experience in some particular time and place. . . . 
So he rejects the idea of natural law. . . . And with the idea of natural law there goes also the 
idea of rights which, a little scornfully perhaps, he has defined as the ‘hypostasis of a 
prophecy.’”). 
 227. Or the self-reliant man, see, e.g., Levinson & Balkin, supra note 27 (suggesting that 
just as Holmes was influenced by Emerson, so too was Holmes’s bad man influenced by (or, 
at the very least, can be better understood by reference to) Emerson’s self-reliant man), or 
the reasonable man, see, e.g., Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 
1047 (Ex.); 11 Ex. 781 (opinion of Baron Alderson), in which the reasonable man of tort law 
was given shape.  As an added benefit, even if, at the end of the day, Holmes’s bad man 
approach does not, through habit, make good men (or self-reliant men, or reasonable men) of 
these previously bad men, any objective outsider judging this person’s conduct would still 
not be able to tell the difference, so long as the threat of sanctions made the bad man behave 
as though he were good.  And that, for Holmes and probably for many of us as well, is about 
as much as we could ever ask of the law. 
 228. HART, supra note 8, at 91. 
 229. See, e.g., Scott J. Shapiro, What is the Internal Point of View? 4 (Oct. 14, 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
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As we have just seen, Holmes did not assume that individuals only acted to 
avoid sanctions but recognized in no uncertain terms that individuals were 
also governed by their inner “sanctions of conscience.”  As a judge, 
however, Holmes was well aware that many individuals were not so 
governed, and it was these individuals who posed the greatest threat to the 
polity, in general, and to the good man, in particular.  Holmes therefore 
encouraged us to focus on these individuals, not in order to define the 
internal point of view “out of existence,” as Hart maintains, but to preserve 
and strengthen the “internal point of view” by protecting its practitioners, 
i.e., the good man, while simultaneously converting the bad man to his 
cause.  Holmes’s vision, like Aristotle’s, suggests that the law has a much 
more important role to play than merely deterring or punishing nefarious 
conduct:  it has a role to play in shaping good conduct as well.230
Although it would take several full-length articles to fully sketch out the 
implications of applying a mixed Aristotelian/Holmesian approach to the 
areas of contracts, torts, and punitive damages, a few brief thoughts can be 
offered at this time.  First, we must remember that the 
Aristotelian/Holmesian mixed approach does not exist for the sake of the 
bad man, but for the good man.  This means that, while the bad man will 
himself feel deterred within the operation of these rules, and will therefore 
be more willing to obey laws with large penalties attached, and more likely 
to break laws with small penalties attached, a judge applying these rules 
ought not feel constrained to adjudicate the case according to the bad man’s 
calculus.  Rather, the judge ought to take the laws as they currently exist 
into account not for the purpose of applying them as written, as would 
Holmes’s eighteenth-century “black-letter man,” but should consider the 
 
 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=937337 (“The problem with Holmes’ theory, rather, is that he 
privileges one type of insider’s point of view over another.  By focusing solely on the 
perspective of the bad man, sanction-centered theories define the other point of view, 
namely, the internal point of view, out of existence.”). 
 230. This analysis, of course, applies to the vast swath of law that also happens to be just, 
but none of this is to say that laws cannot be unjust, and thereby followed for the wrong 
reasons.  Holmes has something to say about this phenomenon as well, and encourages us to 
carefully reconsider our law on a periodic basis, and remove those laws that no longer serve 
important social functions. See Holmes, supra note 3, at 469 (“It is revolting to have no 
better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still 
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the 
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.”).  When such laws are encountered, 
one must throw them out and begin anew by acting as “the man of statistics and the master 
of economics” would, and “consider and weigh the ends of legislation, the means of 
attaining them, and the cost.” Id. at 469, 474.  In considering these ends, of course, even the 
economist must look beyond economics itself to the social good desired by the people 
themselves. See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
majority has a right “to embody their opinions in law”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (2d ed. 1977) (arguing that efficiency theory cannot adjudicate 
between values but it can “clarify a value conflict by showing how much of one value—
efficiency, surely an important, if not necessarily paramount, value in any society—must be 
sacrificed to achieve another”).  What shape will these opinions take?  There is every reason 
to believe they will take a moral shape, and may, in turn, be based on any number of theories 
of social justice, ranging from consequentialist (e.g., utilitarianism) to deontological (e.g., 
Kantian) to virtue-based (e.g., Aristotelian) theories of justice. 
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bad man’s calculus in the context of the social policies embedded within 
these laws, as would the contemporary Holmesian “man of statistics and the 
master of economics.” 
1.  The Mixed Theory of Contracts 
As discussed above, the bad man theory of contracts, as it is traditionally 
understood, has been criticized on a number of grounds.  If, as some 
moralists believe, “[a]n individual is morally bound to keep his 
promises”231 and such promises, when enforced, “foster a society in which 
people can confidently rely on each other,”232 then it is easy to see why 
some commentators would depict a society in which promises are kept for 
internal reasons as “morally superior to the state of constrained avarice 
depicted by ‘badman’ theories of legal obligation.”233
Indeed, because Holmes’s view of contracts is generally seen as the 
source of modern efficient breach theory, detractors usually criticize 
Holmes as its source before going on to attack the theory directly.
 
234  For 
instance, Professor Daniel Friedmann attacks Holmes’s way of looking at 
contract remedies as unacceptable, both normatively and descriptively,235
Why not generalize the proposition so that every person has an “option” 
to transgress another’s rights and to violate the law, so long as he is 
willing to suffer the consequences?  The legal system could thus be 
viewed only as establishing a set of prices, some high and some low, 
which then act as the only constraints to induce lawful conduct.
 
and rhetorically asks: 
236
Why not indeed!  Were Holmes reading this today, he might well 
respond: 
 
I have already generalized the proposition in such a manner, and indeed I 
have derived the specific proposition to which you cite from my broader 
 
 231. FRIED, supra note 50, at 16. 
 232. Farber & Matheson, supra note 70, at 942. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Perillo is one of few scholars who argues against the theory of efficient breach while 
denying that Holmes was its author. See Perillo, supra note 54; see also Friedmann, supra 
note 64. 
 235. Friedmann, supra note 64 (arguing that the theory fails normatively by undermining 
entitlement to contract promises, barring a bargained-for release from them; and 
descriptively by introducing inefficiency rather than efficiency through generating expensive 
transactions—e.g., litigation—rather than avoiding or reducing them).  Friedmann analyzes 
Holmes’s fundamental error as the “conclusion that the remedy provides a perfect substitute 
for the right, when in truth the purpose of the remedy is to vindicate that right, not to replace 
it.” Id. at 1.  However much one disagrees with Holmes, one should at least attempt to 
understand him correctly.  Holmes did not believe legal rights stood alone.  For Holmes, one 
had a legal right merely to the extent that one had a legal remedy:  “One of the many evil 
effects of the confusion between legal and moral ideas . . . is that theory is apt to get the cart 
before the horse, and to consider the right or the duty as something existing apart from and 
independent of the consequences of its breach, to which certain sanctions are added 
afterward.  But, as I shall try to show, a legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if 
a man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment 
of the court;—and so of a legal right.” Holmes, supra note 3, at 458. 
 236. Friedmann, supra note 64, at 1. 
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theory of the bad man.  Your question, if anything, proves my point.  The 
law does exactly as you say:  it establishes a set of prices.  And the bad 
man, caring as he does only for the external sanctions that may be 
imposed from without, rather than any moral law emanating from within, 
looks at the matter in exactly this way.  It is for this reason that I once 
said: 
The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that 
the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does 
not come to pass.  In every case it leaves him free from interference 
until the time for fulfillment has gone by, and therefore free to break 
his contract if he chooses.237
 But you misunderstand me if you think, that by my uttering these 
words, I am condoning the bad man’s behavior.  Far from it.
 
238
In Holmes’s view, a judge or legislature should not lament the fact that 
the bad man thinks and behaves as he does, but embrace it.  Put differently, 
the lawmaker should realize that the bad man will think in such a morally 
despicable way, and must then weigh against the bad man’s behavior the 
moral, social, economic, and political importance of requiring parties to 
keep their contracts.  It must also consider what sort of external sanctions 
might be necessary to not only get the bad man to behave as the good man 
does, but to think as the good man does (i.e., to become good).  In short, the 
lawmaker must “consider and weigh the ends of legislation, the means of 
attaining them, and the cost.”
  I wish to 
stop him just as much as you do.  It is precisely for this reason that we 
must understand how the bad man thinks, so that when his case comes 
before the judge, or the law he violated is reconsidered by a legislature, a 
judge or legislature will be in a better position to count the bad man’s 
“teeth and claws,” and influence him accordingly. 
239
In sum, it is a mistake to view Holmes as pitting the external values of 
predictability and efficiency against the internal values of fairness and 
  If, after undertaking this analysis, the 
lawmaker decides, for example, to discourage efficient breach by 
stipulating that specific performance shall be the remedy for every breach 
of contract, I do not think Holmes would have a problem with this analysis, 
and would likely embrace it, so long as it was seen to be in the polity’s best 
interest, as they themselves understand their preferences.  This, I think, sets 
him far apart from the law and economic theorists who would look to 
Holmes as the founding father of their movement. 
 
 237. HOLMES, supra note 47, at 236. 
 238. See, e.g., Perillo, supra note 54, at 1087 (“Holmes equates a contractual breach with 
a tort, which in French means ‘wrong.’  Consequently, in Holmes’s view, the breach of a 
contract was as much an offense against the law—a legal wrong—as a tort, not the free 
choice that the misinterpreters of Holmes believe he advocated.  Indeed, from the bench, 
Holmes described a breach of contract as a wrong.  In his judicial capacity, he certainly had 
approved of the grant of expectancy damages, and had allowed a price action where the 
seller had deposited securities in escrow, but the buyer had refused to pay, in essence 
requiring specific performance at law.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 239. Holmes, supra note 3, at 474. 
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justice,240
2.  The Mixed Theory of Torts 
 for he was equally kind to both.  Rather, Holmes simply believed 
that a focus on the external point of view was more conducive to protecting 
and fostering the internal point of view.  Focusing on several more 
examples from the law of torts and punitive damages should help further 
illustrate this point. 
Just as contracts scholars have accused Holmes of favoring the amoral 
external point of view over the morally based internal point of view, 
commentators on tort law likewise have pitted these two theories against 
each other241 and placed Holmes on the side that “envisions humans as 
rapacious, selfish beasts, and law as a coercive tool to keep us from 
destroying each other.”242  With such an inauspicious welcome, an apology 
on behalf of Holmes seems in order.243
Behind these attacks exists the assumption that Holmes’s bad man theory 
of law is purely external, and the very real fear such theories “undervalue 
the internal standpoint.”
 
244  The concern, in other words, is that if tort law 
is viewed merely “as a set of incentives, then the concept of ‘wrong’ tends 
to drop out,” and courts will instead choose to impose “liability on the agent 
who can avoid the loss at the least cost, regardless of any responsibility for 
or connection with the victim.”245
 
 240. Linzer, supra note 
  When courts adopt this behavior, or 
when scholars suggest that courts adopt this behavior, this is a very real 
danger indeed.  But when the bad man adopts this behavior (as he 
inevitably does), and when lawmakers seek to understand him for the 
purpose of deterring, punishing, or reforming him, what was once to be 
feared is now to be embraced.  The confusion is created, it seems, by 
conflating the descriptive with the normative, and assuming that one giving 
an account of the external, bad man view must also necessarily be 
advocating the normative acceptance of such a view.  But this, as we have 
seen, is an idea Holmes clearly rejected.  What is necessary here is to 
separate in our minds how the bad man himself views the law, and how the 
lawmaker who understands the bad man views the bad man.  The former, as 
51, at 139 (“Predictability is an important value in law, as should 
be the promotion of economic efficiency.  But most important are fairness and justice.  If 
courts take the amoral approach of Holmes or the second Restatement, defaulting promisors 
will often be able to shift costs ignored by the law to promisees, parties who trusted their 
promisors and who must now take second best through money damages.”). 
 241. Linda Ross Meyer, Just the Facts?, 106 YALE L.J. 1269, 1297 (1997) (“One may 
either take an ‘external standpoint,’ the ‘bad man’ standpoint mentioned by Holmes, or an 
‘internal standpoint,’ the standpoint of a member of a normative community.  The first views 
law as a set of penalties to be avoided.  From this deterrence-based perspective, the law 
involves no obligations; it is merely a fact about the world to take into account in making 
one’s self-interested decisions.  The second understands law as imposing ‘obligations,’ that 
is, providing reasons for taking action, which one accepts as important and virtuous.” (citing 
HART, supra note 8, at 89–91)). 
 242. Id. at 1298. 
 243. The double entendre is intended. 
 244. Meyer, supra note 241, at 1297. 
 245. Id. 
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we have seen, will be concerned with maximizing his own well being, 
whereas the latter will have before its mind the protection of the good man, 
and the deterrence, punishment, and/or reform of the bad man. 
Consider, again, the famous Learned Hand formula, in which we are told 
that negligence liability for a potential tortfeasor will depend on whether 
B < PL, where B is the burden or cost of precaution that must be undertaken 
by the defendant to prevent an accident, P is the probability of the accident 
occurring, and L is the magnitude of the loss.246  In the bad man’s hands, 
such a formula will cause the bad man to “pay tort judgments to the 
accident victims rather than incur the larger cost of avoiding liability” 
whenever “the cost of accidents is less than the cost of prevention.”247
Viewed from the internal, good man perspective, such a rule may seem 
morally repugnant, for it suggests that the bad man may decide to roll the 
dice and injure innocent victims, whenever it is profitable to do so (i.e., 
whenever it is more expensive to take precautions than it is to pay the cost 
of legal liability).  Adopting such a standard has been criticized as 
“writ[ing] laws for the ‘bad man,’” rather than for the good,
 
248
However, as a descriptive matter, the Learned Hand formula brilliantly 
captures how the bad man actually behaves.  Our real problems with this 
formula, it seems to me, are twofold:  first, from the internal perspective, 
we lament that there are people who really behave this way; and second, 
from an external perspective, we lament the inputs used by the bad man.  
The first criticism is easy to understand, but the second requires some 
explanation. 
 and it is easy 
to see why such criticisms garner our sympathy. 
All activities engaged in by all people at all times impose some risk on 
other parties.  And this risk can almost always be reduced by incurring extra 
costs.  All other things equal, cars that travel twenty-five miles per hour are 
safer than cars that travel one hundred miles per hour.  All things equal, 
diesels driving twenty-five miles per hour are safer than compact cars 
driving twenty-five miles per hour.  All things equal, diesel drivers wearing 
helmets are safer than diesel drivers who do not wear helmets.  If we cared 
only about reducing risk, we could require every driver to wear a helmet 
when driving his or her diesel not more than twenty-five miles per hour.  
Yet, we do not do this.  Why?  Presumably, because diesels are expensive, 
driving faster is convenient, and helmets are uncomfortable.  The costs, in 
short, are too high for the concomitant benefit to be realized. 
So far, I take it that nothing I have said is controversial.  Yet, change the 
facts a little, so that Ford is presented with a decision to spend a few extra 
dollars to save a hundred human lives, and such a formula seems repugnant.  
 
 246. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.). 
 247. Posner, supra note 100, at 33. 
 248. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory & Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 
31 (1988) (“The legal standard of care may serve as the minimally acceptable standard of 
behavior, failing which one becomes liable.  But the standard need not be set at the 
minimum—we do not need to follow Justice Holmes’ advice and write laws for the ‘bad 
man.’”). 
2124 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
But, I submit, it is not the formula itself that is repugnant, but the inputs that 
bring it to life.  What we are really angry about is the fact that PL used by 
Ford was too low, because Ford did not value human life highly enough.  
This must be the case, because, remember, Ford (and every automobile 
manufacturer worldwide) can always reduce the number of accidents by 
incurring extra expenses (e.g., making every car with a five inch thick 
stainless steel body), but we as a society do not require this because we as a 
society do not want to pay a fortune for the cars we drive.249
According to the mixed view, a judge or legislature will begin by 
recognizing that a bad man, by definition, behaves as I have described 
above.  What the judge or legislature need not do, however, is blindly parrot 
the bad man’s own analysis, using his inputs, and reaching the same results.  
Remember, under the mixed approach, a lawmaker will want to enact laws 
that, if followed, will tend to make bad men good, and will want to impose 
external sanctions that are sufficiently large to make the bad man follow 
such laws.  How can this be done?  Once again, the lawmaker must 
“consider and weigh the ends of legislation, the means of attaining them, 
and the cost.”
  Thus, in cases 
in which the bad man does not take what the good man would deem 
adequate precautions, we should not blame the bad man, but ourselves.  
Why? 
250  If the bad man is behaving rationally and not taking 
precautions where B > PL, but we, as a society, believe that such 
precautions should be taken, perhaps on account of some deep sense of 
justice, the problem is not with the bad man’s math, but with the way we, as 
a society, are pricing his inputs.  By taking Holmes’s advice and trying to 
tame this particular dragon, we should increase the product of PL by, for 
example, increasing the value of human life to the point where we would 
agree with the bad man not taking a particular precaution, as when, for 
example, all cars must be manufactured with five inch thick stainless steel 
bodies.251
 
 249. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 
 
101, at 1059 n.178 (“[T]he effect of Ford’s avoidance 
of those safety precautions was to enable Ford to lower the Pinto’s sales price.  The cost 
savings, then, were essentially passed on to consumers.”); White, supra note 113, at 131 
n.280 (“Though the court views the two dollar expense as coming out of Ford’s corporate 
profits, in fact, as economics tells us, and as has been repeatedly verified empirically, any 
increases in costs are ultimately passed on to the consumer.  Even the legal circles 
understand and accept that fact, as is reflected in the courts’ decision to impose strict liability 
on the grounds that manufacturers are better able to absorb the risks of harm by passing them 
on to consumers through higher prices.”). 
 250. Holmes, supra note 3, at 474. 
 251. Id. at 466–67.  We should, in short, recognize what Holmes explained over a century 
ago, that 
the torts with which our courts are kept busy to-day are mainly the incidents of 
certain well known businesses.  They are injuries to person or property by 
railroads, factories, and the like.  The liability for them is estimated, and sooner or 
later goes into the price paid by the public.  The public really pays the damages, 
and the question of liability, if pressed far enough, is really the question how far it 
is desirable that the public should insure the safety of those whose work it uses. . . . 
[T]he economic value even of a life to the community can be estimated, and no 
recovery, it may be said, ought to go beyond that amount.  It is conceivable that 
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3.  The Mixed Theory of Punitive Damages 
Closely linked to the purely external view of tort law is the purely 
external view of punitive damages.  Ignoring for the moment that such a 
view was never what Holmes had in mind, a purely external, bad man view 
of punitive damages is nevertheless still misunderstood.  As with the 
discussion of tort law above, one must again insist on the clear definition of 
terms.  Specifically, one must be sure to separate the external reasons that 
exist to govern the bad man’s behavior (i.e., the quantum and probability of 
the external sanctions to be imposed), and the tools at the lawmakers’ 
disposal to combat such behavior, i.e., the manipulation of these inputs. 
In viewing an act exclusively through the lens of the bad man, one would 
see that individuals and companies who know exactly what they will have 
to pay in damages before undertaking dangerous activities will not have a 
financial incentive to reign in those activities whenever paying legal 
damages is less expensive (e.g., by taking more care, or by making their 
products any safer than absolutely necessary), and this, in turn, would lead 
to some difficult to digest outcomes for the good man. 
We have already seen an example of this in our discussion of Ford v. 
Grimshaw above.  There we noted that a “good man” governed by his 
“vaguer sanctions of conscious” might hope that Ford would be governed 
by such internal considerations as well, and should select the option that 
saves human lives.  But we also discussed why this analysis was too 
simplistic, in that every decision, at some level, is a decision about risk, and 
the good man cannot hope to explain why a particular bad man behaves as 
he does by recourse to inner morality.  Even more troublesome, this 
analysis fails to take into account how the bad man actually operates, which 
will hinder legislative and judicial efforts to reign in his activity.  It is for 
this reason, Holmes would argue, that the bad man approach is necessary. 
But, under the mixed approach, one must not misunderstand the bad man 
approach as one in which the bad man’s activities are facilitated.  One must 
not, in other words, do as our own Supreme Court has done in Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, and ensure that the penalty imposed is “reasonably 
predictable in its severity, so that even Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’ can look 
ahead with some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course 
of action or another.”252
 
some day in certain cases we may find ourselves imitating, on a higher plane, the 
tariff for life and limb which we see in the Leges Barbarorum. 
  There is, in short, no need to help the bad man, 
and the point of the mixed approach, as discussed above, is merely to 
understand the bad man in order to deter, punish, or reform him.  And it is 
difficult to see how one is adequately deterring the bad man by requiring 
that the punitive damages be limited to a 1:1 punitive to compensatory ratio, 
and even harder to see how such a ratio would allow courts to punish the 
Id. at 467. 
 252. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2627 (2008) (Souter, J.) (citing 
Holmes, supra note 3, at 459). 
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bad man for his activities.253
But remember that according to the mixed view, Holmes’s bad man 
theory is not telling us that this is how the Fords or Exxons of the world 
ought to make decisions.  Rather, Holmes’s theory is pointing out that this 
is how the Fords and Exxons of the world do make decisions, and then 
leaving it up to the lawmakers to decide how they will change the inputs 
used by the bad man to ensure that these decisions better comport with 
public morality.  And they can do this, as has been stated before, by putting 
on the hat of the “man of statistics and the master of economics,” and by 
carefully “consider[ing] and weigh[ing] the ends of legislation, the means 
of attaining them, and the cost.”
  In short, in an unprecedented effort to 
accommodate Holmes’s bad man, the Supreme Court seems to have 
misunderstood him in the worst possible way, and has allowed him to 
become evil, rather than forcing him to behave as though he were good, if 
not to become good himself in the process. 
254
In short, under the Aristotelian/Holmesian mixed approach, we ought to 
be less powerless than the Supreme Court supposes in our dealings with the 
bad man, and Holmes would have been the first to suggest that the good 
man be given the power to adequately punish the bad man, and to enact a 
penalty sufficient to deter him externally, and reform him internally.
  They can, in short, increase the cost of a 
party that engages in morally reprehensible behavior by increasing the 
availability of punitive damages to punish and deter them, and this is best 
accomplished by ensuring that the wrongdoer’s activities comport with 
notions of social morality. 
255
CONCLUSION 
 
[The law] has the final title to respect that it exists, that it is not a 
Hegelian dream, but a part of the lives of men. 
 — Oliver Wendell Holmes256
 
 253. Richard Abel, Civil Rights and Wrongs, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1421, 1430 (2005) 
(“Unless punitive damages are available, imposed, and sustained on appeal (a tiny fraction of 
cases), tortfeasors can continue to engage in wrongful conduct as long as they are prepared 
to pay its costs.” (citing MARK PETERSON, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, PUB. NO. N-
2342-IJC, PUNITIVE DAMAGES:  PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (1985)). 
 
 254. Holmes, supra note 3, at 469, 474. 
 255. Thus, Professor Pierre J. Schlag was quite right to recognize, as a descriptive matter, 
that 
[b]y specifying a sharp line between forbidden and permissible conduct, rules 
permit and encourage activity up to the boundary of permissible conduct.  The 
application of the same deterrent force to forbidden conduct regardless of how 
close or far it may be from permissible conduct, fails to distinguish between 
flagrant and technical violations. 
Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 384–85 (1985).  As a 
normative matter, however, we need to “predesig[n]at[e] and quantify[] the magnitude of the 
penalty to be applied,” which would “allow Holmes’ proverbial bad man to treat the 
deterrent as a fixed cost of doing business,” id., but should give the courts more flexibility 
under the mixed approach to take the nature of the violation into account (e.g., flagrant 
versus technical violations), and impose a penalty that not only fits the nature of the 
violation, but that will deter individuals from engaging in this sort of conduct in the future. 
 256. Holmes, supra note 3, at 473. 
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In this Article, I have traced Holmes’s controversial “bad man” theory of 
law from its inception in 1897 to its current manifestations in the fields of 
contract law, tort law, and punitive damages jurisprudence, and have shown 
that its development, by law and economics scholars and our own Supreme 
Court, has unduly focused on the external point of view while ignoring the 
internal point of view that the theory was designed to serve.  I have also 
shown how this view has been mistaken, with devastating consequences in 
the fields of contract law, tort law, and punitive damages jurisprudence.  
While Holmes undeniably advocated the separation of law and morality, he 
did it not to disparage morality, but to strengthen it, by deterring and 
reforming the bad man for the sake and protection of the good.  In this 
regard, Holmes’s thought has much more in common with that of the 
inventor of the good man himself, Aristotle, than it does with Bentham’s, 
and the analytic separation between law and morality that Holmes 
encouraged was more for the benefit of the good man than has previously 
been supposed.  Indeed Holmes, who is often thought of as the architect of 
the bad man paradigm, can better be thought of as a builder bridging the 
moral-legal divide and, in the process, allowing for the direct infusion of 
morality into legal discourse. 
 
